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INSURANCE AND ANTITRUST LAW: THE McCARRAN-
FERGUSON ACT AND BEYOND
ALAN M. ANDERSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1945, Congress enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act,1 permit-
ing states to regulate and tax foreign insurance companies doing
business within their borders. The Act also exempts the insurance
industry from the federal antitrust laws if the state regulates the
industry. For more than thirty years, the exemption led a quiet
existence. Between 1945 and 1977, the United States Supreme
* Associate, Faegre & Benson, Minneapolis, Minn. B.A. 1978, Coe College; M.B.A. 1981,
J.D. 1982, Cornell University. The author thanks Professor George A. Hay of the Cornell
Law School for his excellent suggestions and criticisms. Mr. Stuart J. Bassin of the District
of Columbia Bar also provided helpful comments.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976). The Act provides in relevant part:
[§1.] Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by
the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and
that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any
barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several States.
[§2.] (a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall
be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or
taxation of such business. (b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invali-
date, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such
business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance: Pro-
vided, That after June 30, 1948 ... the Sherman Act, and.., the Clayton
Act, and.., the Federal Trade Commission Act,... shall be applicable to
the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by
State Law.
[§3.] (a) Until June 30, 1948,... the Sherman Act, and ... the Clayton Act,
and ... the Federal Trade Commission Act, and... the Robinson-Patman
Anti-Discrimination Act, shall not apply to the business of insurance or to acts
in the conduct thereof. (b) Nothing contained in this chapter shall render the
said Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimi-
date, or act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation.
[§4.] Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to affect in any
manner the application to the business of insurance of the ... National Labor
Relations Act, or . . . the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, or . . . the
Merchant Marine Act, 1920.
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Court heard only three cases addressing its scope. Lower courts
generally interpreted the exemption expansively, according the in-
surance industry broad immunity from the federal antitrust laws.
Recently, the exemption has come under increased scrutiny.3
Within the past five years the Supreme Court has rendered three
decisions addressing the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.4
The decisions have narrowed significantly the scope of the exemp-
tion, but lower courts have struggled to understand and implement
the new interpretation. The Court also has begun to look outside
the McCarran-Ferguson Act and consider the applicability of the
antitrust laws to insurer practices beyond the scope of the exemp-
tion,5 a task that lower courts are just beginning to undertake.
This Article develops a comprehensive framework for applying
the McCarran-Ferguson Act by analyzing the insurance industry's
antitrust exemption and examining antitrust challenges to insurer
practices. After briefly reviewing the legislative history and events
leading to the passage of the Act, the Article develops a systematic
framework for evaluating insurer claims of exemption. This frame-
work then is used to determine whether the insurer practices most
frequently challenged in the courts should be exempt under the
Act. Finally, the Article examines whether certain practices beyond
2. See SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins.
Co. of Am., 359 U.S. 65 (1959); FTC v. National Casualty Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958).
3. The increased scrutiny of the exemption is largely in response to new approaches taken
by insurers, particularly in the health care field, to control rising claim costs. These new
approaches frequently reduce competition among insurers and, consequently, have been
challenged under the antitrust laws. Insurers have responded to the challenges by asserting
their exemption under the Act. See generally M. THOMPSON, ANTITRUST AND THE HEALTH
CARE PROVIDER 174-86 (1979); Halper, The Health Care Industry and the Antitrust Laws:
Collision Course?, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 17 (1980); Rosoff, Antitrust Laws and the Health Care
Industry: New Warriors Into an Old Battle, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 446 (1979).
4. See Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 102 S. Ct. 3002 (1982); Group Life & Health
Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry,
438 U.S. 531 (1978). Several governmental studies have criticized the Act and have ques-
tioned the need for its existence. See 1 NATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST
LAWS AND PROCEDURES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 225-51
(1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 REPORT]; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE TASK
GROUP ON ANTITRUST IMMUNITIES 30 (1977). Moreover, Congressmen have introduced bills
seeking to repeal or modify the Act. See, e.g., S. 1710, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc.
19,527 (1977) (modification); H.R. 13,861, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. 26,000 (re-
peal); H.R. 7623, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 17,557 (1977) (repeal).
5. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
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the scope of the Act also violate the antitrust laws.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT
The insurance industry mirrored the rapid growth of the Ameri-
can economy in the early 1800's, and the prospect of large profits
attracted many unsophisticated newcomers with minimal capital
This expansion created a heightened need for governmental regu-
lation because large casualties and increased competition
threatened the viability of many companies. 6 Each state regulated
the insurance industry to some degree, but the regulation proved
unsatisfactory. Consequently, the insurance industry sought some
type of federal regulation.'
Attempts to achieve federal regulation were set back, however,
by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Paul v. Vir-
ginia.8 In Paul, the plaintiff argued that a Virginia statute requir-
ing foreign insurance companies to post a substantial bond and ob-
tain a license prior to doing business in the state constituted an
impermissible interference with interstate commerce.9 The Court
6. J. DAY, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 18 (1971); Kimball
& Boyce, The Adequacy of State Insurance Rate Regulation: The McCarran-Ferguson Act
in Historical Perspective, 56 MICH. L. REV. 545, 546-48 (1958).
7. Note, The McCarran-Ferguson Act: A Time for Procompetitive Reform, 29 VAND. L.
REv. 1271, 1274 .(1976). Although every state regulated the insurance industry, the scope of
regulation varied from state to state. See J. DAY, supra note 6, at 1-23. Several bills were
introduced in Congress in an attempt to achieve federal regulation, but none were enacted.
See Rose, State Regulation of Property and Casualty Insurance Rates, 28 OHIO ST. L.J.
669, 673 (1967).
Scholars have advanced various reasons for regulating the insurance industry, but the
primary rationale is the need to preserve the stability and solvency of insurers. See R. KEE-
TON, INSURANCE LAW-BASIC TEXT §8.3, at 554-55 (1971); Kimball & Boyce, supra note 6, at
546. An insurance company can provide protection only if an adequate insurance fund is
maintained. Competition among insurers, however, could undermine the maintenance of
this fund. For example, competition could force some insurers to reduce their rates to at-
tract customers. This, in turn, would diminish the funds available to pay claims and, ulti-
mately, a claim might have to go unpaid. To protect policyholders from such an event, the
formation, investments, rates, and accounting practices of insurance companies must be reg-
ulated. Brainard & Dirlam, Antitrust, Regulation, and the Insurance Industry: A Study in
Polarity, 11 ANTITRUST BULL. 235, 237 (1966).
8. 75 U.S. 168 (1868).
9. Id. at 173-74. The insurance companies that Paul represented instructed him to violate
the law in the hope of obtaining judicial reform in the industry. Indeed, the National Board
of Insurance Underwriters furnished Paul with funds and retained two of the best lawyers of
the time to argue the case. See Nehemkis, Paul v. Virginia: The Need for Re-Examination,
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upheld the statute and stated in dictum that "[i]ssuing a policy of
insurance is not a transaction of commerce."'10 Later decisions gen-
erally interpreted this proposition to mean that the federal govern-
ment had no power to regulate the insurance industry under the
commerce clause." As a result of this interpretation, no federal
regulation of the insurance industry was enacted during the next
seventy-five years.
The Supreme Court finally addressed the validity of this inter-
pretation in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Associ-
ation.'2 In South-Eastern Underwriters, members of an insurance
association were indicted on charges of violating the Sherman Act
by fixing rates and monopolizing the insurance business in a six-
state area."3 The district court dismissed the indictment on the ba-
sis of Paul and its progeny, holding that the business of insurance
was not commerce. 4 On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, con-
cluding that Paul was not determinative. The Court noted that the
question addressed in Paul was not whether Congress had the
power to regulate the business of insurance under the commerce
clause, but rather, whether the commerce clause precluded state
regulation.15 After considering the economic position of the insur-
ance industry, the Court determined that the industry was an ap-
27 GEo. L.J. 519, 526-28 (1939).
10. 75 U.S. at 183.
11. See, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495, 510-12 (1913);
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U.S. 389, 401 (1900); Hooper v. California, 155 U.S.
648, 653-54 (1895). None of these cases, however, addressed directly the question of whether
the federal government had the power to regulate the insurance industry. These cases in-
stead addressed the validity of state, as opposed to federal, regulatory schemes. See United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 534, 544-45 (1944). The validity
of federal regulation was not a major concern until Congress passed the Sherman Act in
1890, outlawing "[e]very contract, combination . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Insurance associations com-
monly engaged in price-fixing and boycotts as a means of self-regulation. See Carlson, The
Insurance Exemption from the Antitrust Laws, 57 Tx. L. Rav. 1127, 1130 (1979).
12. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
13. Id. at 534-35. The association controlled 90% of the relevant market, fixed premium
rates and agents' commissions through concerted action, and utilized boycotts and other
acts of coercion and intimidation to injure the businesses of nonmember companies and
agents. Id. at 535-36.
14. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 51 F. Supp. 712, 713, 715 (N.D.
Ga. 1943), rev'd, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
15. 322 U.S. at 534, 544-45. See supra note 11.
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propriate subject for federal regulation under the commerce clause.
The majority then concluded that the Sherman Act applied to the
industry."8
The Court's holding "precipitated widespread controversy and
dismay. Chaos was freely predicted. 1 7 Insurance companies, which
previously had called for federal regulation, now viewed state regu-
lation as the lesser of two evils. 18 The companies feared that price-
fixing and other anti-competitive conduct in which they had en-
gaged with impunity since Paul now would be prohibited under
the Sherman Act.19 The Court's decision also troubled the states
because they feared that state taxation of insurance companies
might be invalid as an undue burden on interstate commerce. 0
Both groups turned to Congress for relief.
Several Congressmen had reacted to the South-Eastern Under-
writers litigation before the Supreme Court's decision. Following
the district court's decision, these Congressmen introduced legisla-
tion that would have completely exempted the insurance industry
from the antitrust laws.2" Congress did not enact any of the bills,
16. 322 U.S. at 539-49, 552-53. The dissenting justices argued that Congress did not in-
tend for the Sherman Act to apply to the insurance business. Id. at 573-74 (Stone, C.J.,
dissenting); id. at 583-84 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The dissenters also argued that fed-
eral regulation of insurance would result in the demise of state regulatory and taxing
schemes. Id. at 581-82 (Stone, C.J., dissenting); id. at 590 (Jackson, J., dissenting in part).
17. New York Insurance Dep't, The Open Competition Rating Law: A Statement of
Principles and Procedures 71, in 111 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF INSURANCE
TO THE NEW YORK LEGISLATURE 355 (1969).
18. See Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 1362,
H.R. 3269 and H.R. 3270, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 29-30, 61-62 (1943).
19. Carlson, supra note 11, at 1133.
20. Kimball & Boyce, supra note 6, at 554. See 91 CONG. REC. 1087 (1945) (remarks of
Rep. Hancock) ("[T]he taxes imposed on insurance companies in many States may be re-
garded as burdens on interstate commerce, and, therefore, unlawful."); id. at 1090 (remarks
of Rep. Gwynne) ("I am afraid some of the taxing policies of some of the States will have to
be revamped, because they are probably unreasonably impeding interstate commerce."). To-
day, this concern is largely unfounded because the Supreme Court "has only rarely held that
the Commerce Clause itself pre-empts an entire field from state regulation, and then only
when a lack of national uniformity would impede the flow of interstate goods." Exxon Corp.
v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 128 (1978).
State governments also feared that South-Eastern Underwriters would result in the dis-
mantling of state regulatory schemes. The Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Robert-
son v. California, 328 U.S. 440 (1946), holding that states could regulate those aspects of the
insurance industry not preempted by federal regulation, dispelled this fear.
21. S. 1362, 78th Cong., 1st Sess (1943); H.R. 3269, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); H.R.
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although one passed the House and nearly gained Senate
approval. 2
2
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC)
subsequently proposed a partial exemption for the insurance in-
dustry. Section 2(a) of the proposal stated that the business of in-
surance is subject to state tax and regulatory laws, and section 2(b)
provided that federal law should not "invalidate, impair, or super-
sede" any state insurance laws. Section 3 completely exempted the
business of insurance from the Federal Trade Commission and
Robinson-Patman Acts. Section 4 defined the applicability of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts to the insurance industry: subsection
(a) provided a temporary moratorium during which the Sherman
and Clayton Acts would not apply; subsection (b) exempted seven
specific activities from the scope of the Sherman Act; and subsec-
tion (c) stated that the Sherman Act, even during the moratorium,
would apply to any act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation.23
Senators McCarran and Ferguson introduced an amended ver-
sion of this proposal.24 The bill represented a compromise between
those who favored full and immediate application of the antitrust
laws and those who favored an absolute exemption. To achieve this
compromise, the Senators deleted section 4(b) of the NAIC propo-
sal from their bill. Consequently, the bill did not exempt any spe-
cific activities from the Sherman Act. The bill, however, retained
section 2(b) of the proposal. Under the bill, therefore, the Sherman
and Clayton Acts could not be applied in any manner that would
"invalidate, impair, or supersede" any state insurance regulation.25
3270, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943).
22. The House vigorously debated and passed H.R. 3270, known as the Walter-Hancock
bill, just seventeen days after the Supreme Court decided South-Eastern Underwriters. See
90 CONG. REC. 6449-55, 6524-57, 6559-65 (1944); 89 CONG. REc. 10,532, 10,659-64 (1943). The
Senate initially passed the bill, but rejected it on reconsideration. 90 CONG. REc. 8054
(1944). The bills favoring total exemption failed primarily because of an anticipated veto by
President Roosevelt, see 91 CONG. R.c. 1087 (1945) (remarks of Rep. Hancock), and because
only a small segment of the insurance industry supported the bills. Weller, The McCarran-
Ferguson Act's Antitrust Exemption for Insurance: Language, History and Policy, 1978
DuKE L.J. 587, 592 n.34.
23. The complete text of the NAIC proposal is printed in 90 CONG. REc. A4406 (1944).
For a discussion of the NAIC's activities in developing and lobbying for its proposal, see
Weller, supra note 22, at 593-95.
24. S. 340, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 91 CONG. REC. 330 (1945).
25. See id.
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Within two weeks after the bill's introduction, the Senate passed
the bill with two amendments. 6 One of the amendments expanded
former section 4(c) and made the Sherman Act applicable not only
to acts involving boycott, coercion, and intimidation, but to agree-
ments to boycott, coerce, or intimidate as well. The second
amendment arose out of a perceived conflict between sections 2(b)
and 4(a). Some senators argued that, to the extent state regulatory
laws conflicted with federal law, section 2(b) made the Sherman
and Clayton Acts permanently inapplicable, while section 4(a)
made the antitrust laws applicable after the moratorium period.28
To resolve the potential confusion, the Senate amended section
2(b) to specifically exempt the Sherman and Clayton Acts from the
operation of section 2(b).2 9 Thus, as passed by the Senate, the Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Act contained only a short moratorium during
which the antitrust laws would not apply to the business of
insurance.
The House, however, did not perceive any conflict between sec-
tions 2(b) and 4(a), and passed the bill without either Senate
amendment.30 The House debates suggest, however, that House
members interpreted the bill as providing only a limited morato-
rium during which the Sherman and Clayton Acts would not
apply.3 1
26. See id. at 464, 478-88.
27. The Senate Judiciary Committee recommended this change, 'which did not generate
much debate on the floor. See id. at 478.
28. I think there is an ambiguity in the bill .... In section 4(a) of the bill it is
implied that in 1948 the Sherman Act shall again come into force unless some-
thing has been done in the meantime. However, in section 2(b) it is implied
that even in 1948 the Sherman Act shall not invalidate any State regulatory
law ... We should straighten out the difference between the two sections.
91 CONG. REc. 485 (1945) (remarks of Sen. Taft). See also id. at 484 (remarks of Sen. Taft
and Sen. Murdock); id. at 486 (remarks of Sen. Murdock); id. at 486-87 (remarks of Sen.
Ferguson).
29. Section 2(b) then read:
No act except ... the Sherman Act and/or ... the Clayton Act shall be
construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for
the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or
tax upon such business, unless such act specifically so provides.
Id. at 486.
30. See id. at 1085.
31. See, e.g., id. at 1090 (remarks of Rep. Gwynne) ("What the bill does is to grant a
moratorium."); id. at 1092 (remarks of Rep. Springer) ("This measure seeks only to estab-
1983]
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The joint conference committee drastically altered the bill. The
committee deleted section 3, which had exempted the insurance
industry from the Federal Trade Commission and Robinson-Pat-
man Acts.32 The committee also sought to remove any possible am-
biguity between sections 2(b) and 4(a) by adding a proviso to sec-
tion 2(b). This proviso stated that the Sherman, Clayton, and
Federal Trade Commission Acts would apply to the business of in-
surance after the moratorium period "to the extent that such busi-
ness is not regulated by state law."'33 The proviso was apparently a
compromise measure between a faction in Congress that favored a
complete exemption from the antitrust laws and another faction
that favored only temporary relief in the form of a moratorium.3
By this proviso the committee transformed a limited moratorium
into a permanent exemption to the extent that states regulated the
insurance industry. The conference committee also revived the
Senate amendment that would make the Sherman Act applicable
to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate.3 5
The House approved the joint bill without debate;36 the Senate
debated the bill for two days before passing it without change.3 7
President Roosevelt then signed the McCarran-Ferguson Act into
law on March 9, 1945. 88
As enacted, the McCarran-Ferguson Act provides in section 1
that state regulation and taxation of the insurance industry is in
the public interest, and that congressional silence on these subjects
does not impose any barrier on the states. Section 2(a) provides
that the business of insurance is subject to state taxing and regula-
tory schemes. Section 2(b) declares that no federal law shall be
construed to "invalidate, impair, or supersede" any state regula-
tion or taxation of the insurance industry unless the federal law
lish a moratorium. . . ."); id. at 1086 (remarks of Rep. Walter) ("This [bill] is merely a
moratorium. That is all it is.").
32. H.R. REP. No. 213, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945). See 91 CONG. REc. 1396 (1945).
33. H.R. REP. No. 213, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1945). See 91 CONG. REc. 1396 (1945).
34. See 91 CONG. REC. 1480-81 (1945) (remarks of Sen. Murdock).
35. Id. at 1396.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 1442-44, 1477-89. Only Senator Pepper opposed the bill, arguing strenu-
ously that states should not be given the power to preclude the application of the federal
antitrust laws. See, e.g., id. at 1443-44.
38. See id. at 1992.
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specifically relates to the business of insurance. This section fur-
nishes an exception for the Sherman, Clayton and Federal Trade
Commission Acts, which are applicable to the extent that the busi-
ness of insurance is not regulated by state law. Finally, section 3(b)
provides that the Sherman Act shall apply to any agreement or act
of "boycott, coercion, or intimidation. '39
III. THE SCOPE OF THE INSURANCE ExEMPTION: A FRAMEWORK FOR
ANALYSIS
The assertion of an exemption under the McCarran-Ferguson
Act should be examined in a logical fashion. Unfortunately, courts
often fail to do S0.40 In addition, commentators, while recognizing
the relevant issues, have failed to develop a systematic analysis for
assessing the validity of an insurer's assertion of an antitrust ex-
emption under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.41 Such an analysis
should begin by asking whether the insurer's activity is an ordinary
part of the business of insurance. If it is, then the extent to which
the activity is regulated by the state must be considered. Finally,
one should determine whether the activity involves a form of boy-
cott, coercion, or intimidation. If the activity is not regulated effec-
tively by the state, or if the activity constitutes a form of boycott,
coercion, or intimidation, the activity will be subject to close scru-
tiny under the antitrust laws. The activity, therefore, must satisfy
all three steps in the analysis to qualify for an exemption.
A. The "Business of Insurance" Requirement
Section 2 of the McCarran-Ferguson Act specifies the first re-
quirement for determining whether an insurer's activity is within
the scope of the exemption. The section requires the activity to be
part of the "business of insurance." Whether this requirement has
been satisfied frequently determines whether an insurer is exempt
from the antitrust laws. The issue is difficult to resolve because the
Act does not define "business of insurance," and the legislative his-
39. See supra note 1.
40. See, e.g., Bartholomew v. Virginia Chiropractors Ass'n, 612 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980).
41. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 11; Weller, supra note 22; Note, Qualified Immunity for
Insurers Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 46 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 396 (1978).
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tory is ambiguous.42
Faced with the difficulty of defining "business of insurance," the
lower courts initially construed the phrase broadly, maintaining
that it included any activity in which an insurance company might
engage.4 s In a series of decisions culminating in Group Life &
Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co.44 and Union Labor Life
Insurance Co. v. Pireno,45 however, the Supreme Court developed
and refined a restrictive three-prong test for determining whether
an insurer's activity is within the business of insurance. Problems
exist with this test, however-the most serious one being that the
test excludes several activities that Congress considered a part of
the business of insurance.
1. The Test
The Supreme Court in Royal Drug created a three-prong test for
determining whether an insurer's activity is within the business of
insurance: the first prong examines whether the activity involves
the underwriting or spreading of risk; the second prong focuses on
whether the activity involves the insurer-insured relationship; and
the third prong, as refined in Pireno, asks whether the activity is
limited to entities within the insurance industry, thus conforming
to the legislative intent of the Act.
a. The Underwriting or Spreading of Risk
To satisfy the first prong of the test, the activity must involve
the underwriting of risk.46 This part of the test is based upon the
Court's ruling in SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. of
America,47 the Court's first attempt to define the "business of in-
42. Compare 91 CONG. REc. 480 (1945) (remarks of Sen. Murdock) (suggesting that the
"business of insurance" is synonymous with "insurance companies") with Group Life &
Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 220-21 (1979) (legislative history suggests
that Congress equated "business of insurance" with underwriting and spreading of risk).
43. See, e.g., California League of Indep. Ins. Producers v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 175
F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Cal. 1959); Professional & Business Men's Life Ins. Co. v. Banker's Life
Co., 163 F. Supp. 274 (D. Mont. 1958); Miley v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 148 F.
Supp. 299 (D. Mass.), afl'd, 242 F.2d 758 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 828 (1957).
44. 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
45. 102 S. Ct. 3002 (1982).
46. Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 211 (1979).
47. 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
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surance."4  In Variable Annuity, the Securities and Exchange
Commission sought to compel a seller of variable-annuity insur-
ance contracts to comply with the federal securities laws. The in-
surer claimed an exemption from those laws under the McCarran-
Ferguson Act. A plurality of the Court rejected the insurer's claim,
holding that the sale of variable-annuity contracts was beyond the
scope of the business of insurance.4" The plurality identified the
transfer of risk as an essential element of insurance: an activity
that does not transfer a significant element of risk from the policy-
holder to the insurance company is not within the business of
insurance.50
Pireno and Royal Drug emphasize that the underwriting of risk
must increase the number of policyholders subject to the same
48. Commentators occasionally cite FTC v. National Casualty Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958), as
the first Supreme Court case construing the phrase "business of insurance". See, e.g., Com-
ment, The McCarran Act's Antitrust Exemption for "The Business of Insurance": A
Shrinking Umbrella, 43 TENN. L. REV. 329, 338-39 (1976). In National Casualty, the Su-
preme Court considered the validity of an FTC cease-and-desist order prohibiting the inter-
state shipment of allegedly unfair and deceptive advertising. Because the Court was con-
cerned primarily with whether the state regulation was sufficient to invoke the protection of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the Court assumed that the activities involved the "business of
insurance" and did not attempt to define that phrase.
49. 359 U.S. at 71-73. In a concurring opinion, Justices Brennan and Stewart contended
that the sale of variable-annuity insurance contracts should not be exempt under the federal
securities laws because the administration of such contracts caused an insurance company to
act "in a way totally foreign to the business of a traditional life insurance and annuity com-
pany" and involved a "predominant element of the business of an investment company." Id.
at 81 (Brennan, J., concurring).
50. Comparing the variable annuities involved with conventional insurance, the plurality
stated:
The difficulty is that, absent some guarantee of fixed income, the variable an-
nuity places all the investment risks on the annuitant, none on the com-
pany. . . .But we conclude that the concept of "insurance" involves some in-
vestment risk-taking on the part of the company. The risk of mortality,
assumed here, gives these variable annuities an aspect of insurance. Yet it is
apparent, not real; superficial, not substantial. In hard reality the issuer of a
variable annuity that has no element of a fixed return assumes no true risk in
the insurance sense .... We deal with a more conventional concept of risk-
bearing when we speak of "insurance." For in common understanding "insur-
ance" involves a guarantee that at least some fraction of the benefits will be
payable in fixed amounts .... [Here, t]here is no true underwriting of risks,
the one earmark of insurance as it has commonly been conceived of in popular
understanding and usage.
Id. at 71, 73 (footnotes omitted).
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risk.51 An activity that merely reduces the insurer's liability, and
therefore its financial risk, is insufficient. "[U]nless there is some
element of spreading risk more widely, there is no underwriting of
risk. '52 Furthermore, the spreading of risk must be effectuated by
means of the insurance contract between the parties.5
An insurance company assumes two risks when it issues a policy.
The first risk is the probability that the insured event will occur;
the second risk is the magnitude of the payment should the in-
sured event occur.5 The Court's risk-spreading test apparently en-
compasses only those activities that affect the first of these two
risks. Increasing the number of policyholders subject to the same
event will reduce variance, producing a statistically more accurate
determination of the insured event's probability. Spreading the
risk through an enlarged pool of policyholders, however, does not
affect the size of the settlement.5 5 Thus, under the first prong of
the test, activities calculated to reduce the magnitude of the in-
surer's liability for a claim are not part of the business of
insurance.
b. The Insurer-Insured Relationship
The second prong of the test requires that the activity relate to
the contract between the insurer and the insured.56 This part of
the test arose from the Court's holding in SEC v. National Securi-
ties, Inc. In National Securities, the SEC sought to dissolve a
merger between two insurance companies on the ground that the
shareholders' approval of the merger was procured through fraud.
Applying a different approach from that used in Variable Annuity,
the Court concluded that the merger was outside the business of
insurance. The Court distinguished the insurance business from
51. Pireno, 102 S. Ct. at 3009; Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 211.
52. 440 U.S. at 214 n.12.
53. See 102 S. Ct. at 3009.
54. See Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 308, 323 n.30 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 86 (1982).
55. Both the provider agreement in Royal Drug and the peer review committee in Pireno
affected the size of the settlement and were held to be outside the business of insurance. See
Pireno, 102 S. Ct. at 3009; Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 214.
56. Pireno, 102 S. Ct. at 3008; Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 215-16.
57. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
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the business of insurance, and announced that the "core" of the
business of insurance involves the relationship between the insurer
and the policyholder.5" Consequently, to be part of the business of
insurance, an activity must pertain to, or affect, that relationship.
Activities affecting the insurance policy, its interpretation or en-
forcement, and other acts related to the insurer's reliability, there-
fore, are part of the business of insurance; activities affecting the
insurance company's relationship with its stockholders are not. 9
In Royal Drug and Pireno, the Supreme Court refined the defi-
nition of the business of insurance by requiring that the activity
directly affect the insurer-insured relationship.60 Under this refine-
ment, agreements that are not part of the insurance contract and
therefore have only an indirect effect upon the insurer-insured re-
lationship, do not qualify as part of the business of insurance, even
though such agreements might affect the financial reliability of the
company."' Thus, to the extent that the Court in National Securi-
ties held that the business of insurance included "other activities
. ..closely [related] to ... [the] status [of] reliable insurers,"62
the Court's current formulation of the insurer-insured test is mark-
edly narrower.
58. The statute did not purport to make the States supreme in regulating all the
activities of insurance companies; its language refers not to the persons or
companies who are subject to state regulation, but to laws "regulating the busi-
ness of insurance." Insurance companies may do many things which are sub-
ject to paramount federal regulation; only when they are engaged in the "busi-
ness of insurance" does the statute apply .... [W]hatever the exact scope of
the statutory term, it is clear where the focus [is]-it [is] on the relationship
between the insurance company and the policyholder.
Id. at 459-60.
59. Id. at 460. Following the Supreme Court's decision in National Securities, lower fed-
eral courts consistently applied the insurer-insured relationship test rather than the risk-
spreading test of Variable Annuity. See, e.g., Zelson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 549 F.2d
62 (8th Cir. 1977); Allied Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 418 F. Supp. 157 (D. Neb.
1976). Application of the insurer-insured relationship test proved difficult, however, when
insurer practices affected policyholders and imposed restraints on other businesses, such as
when the insurance was "tied" to another product or when the insurer contracted with prov-
iders for benefits promised under the insurance policy. Note, supra note 41, at 401-06. Ap-
plication of the test in the latter situation-provider agreements-presented the Supreme
Court in Royal Drug with the opportunity to define further the "business of insurance."
60. Pireno, 102 S. Ct. at 3008; Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 216.
61. Pireno, 102 S. Ct. at 3009-10; Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 216-17.
62. 393 U.S. at 460.
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c. Conformity to Legislative Intent
The Supreme Court developed the final prong of the test in
Royal Drug. This prong recognizes and attempts to fulfill the con-
gressional intent in enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act.6 3 The
primary purpose of Congress in passing the Act was to immunize
state regulatory and taxing schemes from attack as unreasonable
burdens on interstate commerce.6 This federalistic purpose is ir-
relevant, however, when determining the applicability of the anti-
trust laws to the insurance industry. 5 Instead, the secondary pur-
pose of the Act, "to give insurance companies only a limited
exemption from the antitrust laws," controls in antitrust cases.66 In
Royal Drug, the Court asserted that this secondary purpose could
be furthered only by construing the phrase "business of insurance"
narrowly. Thus, the Court maintained that any uncertainty regard-
ing the applicability of the exemption should be resolved against a
63. 440 U.S. at 217.
64. Inevitable uncertainties which followed the handing down of the decision in
the Southeastern Underwriters Association case, with respect to the constitu-
tionality of State laws, have raised questions in the minds of insurance execu-
tives, State insurance officials, and others as to the validity of State tax laws as
well as State regulatory provisions; thus making desirable legislation by the
Congress to stabilize the general situation.
... Your committee believes there is.urgent need for an immediate expres-
sion of policy by the Congress with respect to the continued regulation of the
business of insurance by the respective States. Already many insurance compa-
nies have refused, while others have threatened refusal to comply with State
tax laws, as well as with other State regulations, on the ground that to do so,
when such laws may subsequently be held unconstitutional in keeping with the
precedent-smashing decision in the Southeastern Underwriters case, will sub-
ject insurance executives to both civil and criminal actions for misappropria-
tion of company funds.
H.R. REP. No. 68, 79th Cong., 1st Seas. 2 (1945). See H.R. REP. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3, reprinted in 1945 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 670, 671; S. REP. No. 20, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1945). The Supreme Court recognized the primarily federalistic purpose
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act when it upheld the Act against constitutional challenge in
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429 (1946) ("Congress' purpose [in passing
the Act] was broadly to give support to the existing and future state systems for regulating
and taxing the business of insurance.").
65. 440 U.S. at 218 n.18.
66. Id. Congress' consideration and rejection of bills proposing a blanket immunity indi-
cates that Congress intended to provide only a limited exemption. See supra notes 21-22
and accompanying text. See also Weller, supra note 22, at 598.
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grant of antitrust immunity.6 7 In Pireno, the Court indicated that
an activity can escape the antitrust laws only if the activity is con-
fined entirely to the insurance industry. 8 The Court maintained
that Congress did not intend to include within the business of in-
surance agreements or practices that involve parties outside the in-
surance industry. Consequently, the Court held that such agree-
ments or practices are subject to antitrust regulation.
2. The Problem
Several difficulties exist with the Court's three-prong test. The
most significant problem is that the test excludes cooperative rate-
making and pooling of loss data from the business of insurance.
The dissent in Royal Drug recognized this problem and criticized
the majority's approach.6 9 Congress clearly intended to include
both of these activities within the scope of the exemption as long
as the states continued to regulate the industry.7 0 The Court's test,
however, would exclude these activities because neither coopera-
tive rate-making nor pooling of loss data directly affects the
probability of the insured event.7 1 Rather, these activities affect
only the premium charged for the insurance. Moreover, neither ac-
tivity directly affects the insurer-insured relationship in the man-
ner prescribed by the Court in Royal Drug because the only parties
involved in either activity are insurance companies.
67. See, e.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggist Ass'n, Inc., 425 U.S. 1
(1976); Connel Const. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616
(1975); FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726 (1973).
68. 102 S. Ct. at 3008-09. See also 440 U.S. at 224 ("There is not the slightest suggestion
in the legislative history that Congress in any way contemplated that arrangements...,
which involve ... entities outside the insurance industry, are the 'business of insurance.' ")
(footnote omitted).
69. 440 U.S. at 244 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
70. See 91 CONG. REc. 1481 (1945) (remarks of Sen. Ferguson); 90 CONG. REc. A4405
(1944).
71. Two commentators have argued that because cooperative rate-making and the pooling
of loss data lower the premiums that an insurer charges, those activities do spread risk.
They observed that the lower premiums created by those activities attract more customers
to the insurance company, and the enlarged customer pool, in turn, "spread[s] risk between
customers by making the company's actual average payout come closer to the statistically
predicted result." Sullivan & Wiley, Recent Antitrust Developments: Defining the Scope of
Exemptions, Expanding Coverage, and Refining the Rule of Reason, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
265, 283 (1979).
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In Owens v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 72 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit implicitly recognized this
problem with the Supreme Court's test. The plaintiff in Owens al-
leged that the defendant had conspired with other insurance com-
panies to create a monopoly that would force the plaintiff out of
business. One of the questions faced by the Third Circuit was
whether cooperative rate-making was within the "business of in-
surance." After quoting at length from the Supreme Court's dis-
cussion of Congress' intent to include such activity within the ex-
emption, the court concluded, "it is clear that at least [cooperative
rate-making is within] the business of insurance, either because [it]
pertain[s] to risk-spreading or to the contract between the insurer
and the insured. . . .", In reaching this conclusion though, the
court did not attempt to explain how cooperative rate-making sat-
isfies the Royal Drug test.
One commentator has attempted to resolve this problem by
reading the risk-spreading test broadly to include insurer activities
related to the determination of coverage and premiums.7 4 The dif-
ficulty with this broad reading is that it renders the insurer-in-
sured relationship test superfluous: an insurer's decision regarding
coverage and premiums almost always would affect its relations
with current or potential policyholders. 75
Rather than read the Supreme Court's test more broadly than
the Court intended, courts should recognize pooling of loss data
and cooperative rate-making as exceptions to the three-prong
Royal Drug test. The majority's discussion of these two activities,
as well as the dissent's interpretation of the majority opinion, is
consistent with the creation of such exceptions. 6 Congress clearly
intended to include cooperative rate-making and pooling of loss
data within the business of insurance. 77 The Court's three-prong
72. 654 F.2d 218 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
73. 654 F.2d at 224-25.
74. Note, The Definition of "Business of Insurance" Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act
After Royal Drug, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1475, 1479 (1980).
75. Id. at 1479 n.26.
76. See 440 U.S. at 221-24; id. at 244-45 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In addition, the Court
intimated that activities that involve the insurer-agent relationship, but do not fit within
the Court's three-prong test of the "business of insurance", might constitute an additional
exception. See id. at 224 n.32; infra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 70.
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test, therefore, should be viewed as a device for determining
whether activities not explicitly included by Congress are also
within the business of insurance.
A second problem with the Supreme Court's three-prong test for
the business of insurance is that it fails to explain the relationship
among the three prongs.78 The Court characterized the spreading
of risk as "an indispensible characteristic of insurance," 9 while
describing the insurer-insured relationship as only "[a]nother com-
monly understood aspect of the business of insurance. '80 The rela-
tionship between the business of insurance and the prong that re-
quires the activity to conform to legislative intent is also uncertain.
The Supreme Court's decision in Pireno partially ameliorated
the problem of understanding the relationship between the three
prongs of the test. In Pireno, the Court stated that "[n]one of the
[three] criteria is necessarily determinative in itself. ... 81 Thus,
a court must apply each prong of the test in conjunction with the
other two.82 The relative weight accorded to each prong of the test,
however, remains uncertain.
B. The State Regulation Requirement
Section 2 of the McCarran-Ferguson Act addresses state regula-
tion of activity within the "business of insurance." In the frame-
work for analyzing insuter claims of antitrust immunity, two re-
quirements must be met. Section 2(b) of the Act establishes the
first requirement, defining the extent of state regulation required
to exempt insurer activity from the antitrust laws. The second re-
quirement arises from a constitutional limitation on state regula-
tion of insurance.
78. Sullivan & Wiley, supra note 71, at 282 n.77. See also Proctor v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 308, 319 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 86 (1982).
79. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 212.
80. Id. at 215.
81. 102 S. Ct. at 3009. See also id. at 3010.
82. Unfortunately, some courts have considered only one part of the test in reaching a
decision. See, e.g., Pireno v. New York State Chiropractic Ass'n, 650 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1981)
(primarily applying risk-spreading test), aff'd sub nom. Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno,
102 S. Ct. 3002 (1982); Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Va., 624
F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1980) (applying insurer-insured relationship test), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
916 (1981); Bartholomew v. Virginia Chiropractors Ass'n, Inc., 612 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1979)
(applying insurer-insured relationship test), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980).
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1. The Extent of State Regulation
Section 2(b) of the Act specifies that the business of insurance is
exempt from the antitrust laws only if regulated by the states. To
allow the states time to enact regulations, section 3(a) of the Act
provided a moratorium during which the antitrust laws would not
apply. 3 Although the Act invites state regulation of the insurance
industry, this does not mean that state regulation will foreclose ap-
plication of the federal antitrust laws. The question that must be
addressed then is what type of state regulation the Act requires.
One should look initially to the language of the Act. Generally,
courts have focused on the proviso of section 2(b) which declares
that the antitrust laws "shall be applicable to the business of in-
surance to the extent that such business is not regulated by state
law." One commentator has argued that the "invalidate, impair, or
supersede" clause of section 2(b) is equally applicable.8 4 The legis-
lative history of the Act, however, contradicts this view. Congress
inserted the "invalidate, impair, or supersede" clause to retain au-
thority to legislate further if state regulation proved inadequate.
But any supplementary legislation would have to apply specifically
to the business of insurance to avoid implicit repeal of the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act.85 In addition, the final Senate debate suggests
83. Carlson, supra note 11, at 1137. Shortly after the passage of the Act, the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners develbped model acts designed to insulate the in-
surance industry from federal antitrust laws. Id. By 1964, most states had adopted one or
more of these model acts. See generally J. DAY, supra note 6, at 28-31.
84. Weller, supra note 22, at 602-05. Weller bases his argument on several statements by
Senators O'Mahoney, McCarran, and Murdock that suggest that § 2(b) made the Act
stronger than the original Senate version, and that the first clause of § 2(b) applies to the
antitrust laws as well. See 91 CONG. REc. 1444, 1478, 1489 (1945). These statements, how-
ever, were responses to Senator Pepper, who objected to the proviso clause because he
feared that the clause immunized insurance companies from the operation of the antitrust
laws. In addition, the conference committee bill was a compromise measure between the
Senate version, which provided only a short moratorium, and the House version, which pro-
vided a broader exemption. See id. at 1480-81 (remarks of Sen. Murdock). The House con-
ferees would not have agreed to a bill that was stronger than the original Senate version.
Finally, Weller also states that his interpretation is consistent with the federalistic purposes
of the Act. Weller, supra note 22, at 605. The federalistic purposes, however, are inapposite
to considerations of the McCarran-Ferguson Act and the antitrust laws. See supra notes 64-
66 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text (further sug-
gesting that Weller's argument is not supported by the legislative history or case law).
85. See 91 CONG. REc. 1487-88 (1945) (remarks of Sens. Ferguson, O'Mahoney, and
Barkley).
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that the applicability of the federal antitrust laws was to be gov-
erned by the proviso, and not by the "invalidate, impair, or super-
sede" language.88 Moreover, absent the proviso, the antitrust laws
would not be applicable at all, because they are not related specifi-
cally to the business of insurance. Indeed, courts have recognized
this distinction and have applied the "invalidate, impair, or super-
sede" clause only when determining whether a state insurance reg-
ulation conflicted with a federal non-trade regulatory statute."
The interpretation of the proviso in section 2(b) is critical to a
determination of what constitutes sufficient state regulation to pre-
clude application of the antitrust laws. Unfortunately, the Su-
preme Court has never defined the phrase "to the extent that." In
FTC v. National Casualty Co.,88 the Court held that general state
legislation was not insufficient per se to satisfy the section 2(b) re-
quirement.8 ' The Court suggested, however, that a statutory
framework that was a mere pretense would be insufficient.9
Lower courts have interpreted section 2(b) more liberally than
the Supreme Court did in National Casualty, and have main-
tained that a reasonably comprehensive statutory scheme authoriz-
ing state regulation of the business of insurance is sufficient. The
standard generally applied by the lower courts is that "a State reg-
ulates the business of insurance within the meaning of [section
2(b)] when a State statute generally proscribes. . . or permits or
authorizes certain conduct on the part of. . . insurance compa-
nies.1 Thus, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
86. See, e.g., id. at 1481 (remarks of Sen. Ferguson).
Rules of statutory construction also support the interpretation that the proviso is an ex-
ception to the general language of § 2(b). See 1A, 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION §§ 21.11, 47.08, 47.09 (4th ed. 1972).
87. See, e.g., Perry v. Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 987 (1980); Cochran v. Paco, Inc., 606 F.2d 460 (5th Cir. 1979); Spirt v.
Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 475 F. Supp. 1298 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd in part & rev'd in
part, 691 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1982).
88. 357 U.S. 560 (1958).
89. Id. at 564-65.
90. For an analysis that reaches a similar conclusion, see Crawford v. American Title Ins.
Co., 518 F.2d 217, 222-24 (5th Cir. 1975) (Godbold, J., dissenting).
91. California League of Indep. Ins. Producers v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 175 F. Supp.
857, 860 (N.D. Cal. 1959). Another court recently observed that "[e]ven if the alleged activi-
ties [are] not specifically regulated, the exemption [will] still be effective as long as the
mechanism for regulation [is] available. . .." Steinberg v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
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cuit in Ohio AFL-CIO v. Insurance Rating Board9 2 allowed an ex-
emption under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, reasoning that the
state sufficiently regulated the insurance industry although evi-
dence indicated that the Ohio insurance commissioner did not en-
force the state laws and essentially permitted insurers to regulate
themselves.9 3
The legislative history of the Act, however, indicates that Con-
gress intended the exemption to be available only when effective
state regulation exists."4 Otherwise, neither federal nor state law
actually would regulate insurer activity, leaving the public unpro-
486 F. Supp. 122, 124 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
92. 451 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 917 (1972).
93. 451 F.2d at 1182-84. Other courts have reached similar results. See, e.g., Crawford v.
American Title Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1975); California League of Indep. Ins. Pro-
ducers v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 175 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Cal. 1959). The Supreme Court
recently intimated approval of the lower federal courts' interpretation of the state regula-
tion requirement. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 540 n.9 (1978).
Apparently, only two judges have disagreed with the lower courts' interpretation, adopt-
ing the view that only active and effective state regulation will satisfy the requirements of
the exemption. See Ohio AFL-CIO v. Insurance Rating Bd., 409 U.S. 917 (1972) (Douglas J.,
dissenting), denying cert. to 451 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1971); Crawford v. American Title Ins.
Co., 518 F.2d 217, 221-30 (5th Cir. 1975) (Godbold, J., dissenting).
Recently, the District of Columbia and Second Circuits have intimated that they would
require effective state regulation of an insurer's activity before the insurer could qualify
under the Act. See Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 308, 316 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 86 (1982); Pireno v. New York State Chiropractic Ass'n, 650 F.2d
387, 390 n.5 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'd sub nom. -Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 102 S. Ct.
3002 (1982). See also United States v. Crocker Nat'l Corp., 656 F.2d 428, 452-55 (9th Cir.
1981) (holding that state law must regulate the specific practices challenged under the fed-
eral antitrust law), cert. granted sub. nom. BankAmerica Corp. v. United States, 456 U.S.
1005 (1982).
Ineffective state regulation is not uncommon. See 1979 REPORT, supra note 4, at 226;
Kimball & Boyce, supra note 6, at 565; Note, supra note 7, at 1292-98. For a report conclud-
ing that state regulation of the insurance industry is ineffective because of underbudgeting,
lack of trained personnel, and other factors, see S. REP. No. 1834, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-8,
239-47 (1960).
94. Commentators have argued for years that effective state regulation is a prerequisite to
the availability of the exemption. E.g., Carlson, supra note 11, at 1155; Kimball & Boyce,
supra note 6, at 570-75; Comment, State Regulation Under the McCarran Act, 47 TUL. L.
REV. 1069, 1084 (1973).
The Supreme Court's recent restrictive interpretations of the exemption also suggest that
the lower courts' liberal reading of the state regulation requirement is incorrect. See Sulli-
van & Wiley, supra note 71, at 288-89. Moreover, the use of the term "regulate" in defining
the type of state law that will trigger the exemption indicates that the drafters of the Act
contemplated effective state regulation. See Kimball & Boyce, supra note 6, at 568-69.
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tected. Congress intended the proviso of section 2(b) to fill this
potential gap by requiring specific state regulation of the activity
before allowing an exemption under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 5
Because the proviso originated in a conference committee, the
only evidence of congressional intent is the Senate's consideration
of the committee report. The limited legislative history supports
the proposition that Congress intended effective state regulation to
be a prerequisite to antitrust immunity. Several senators distin-
guished state legislation from state regulation, indicating that only
the latter would suffice under the Act."' In addition, Senator Bar-
kley inquired
whether, where States attempt to occupy the field-but do it
inadequately-by going through the form of legislation so as to
deprive the [antitrust laws] of their jurisdiction, is it the Sena-
tor's interpretation of the conference report that in a case of
that kind, where the legislature fails adequately even to deal
with the field it attempts to cover, [the antitrust laws] still
would apply?9 7
Senator McCarran responded that this was his interpretation of
the Act.98 Furthermore, although President Roosevelt did not pur-
port to declare the intent of Congress, he did announce that the
Act required effective state regulation of the insurance industry for
the exemption to apply.99
The relationship between section 2(b) and the state action doc-
trine, as expressed in Parker v. Brown, 00 further supports the
95. W. FREEDMAN, RICHARDS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 189-90 (5th ed. 1952).
96. See, e.g., 91 CONG. REC. 1443-44 (1945) (remarks of Sens. McCarran, O'Mahoney,
Murdock, and White).
97. Id. at 1444.
98. Id. Senator Barkley later stated that he was voting for the Act on the basis of this
interpretation. See id. at 1488.
99. Upon signing the Act into law, President Roosevelt stated:
After the moratorium period, the antitrust laws. . . will be applicable in full
force and effect to the business of insurance except to the extent that the
states have assumed the responsibility, and are effectively performing that re-
sponsibility, for the regulation of whatever aspect of the insurance business
may be involved.
Press release by President Roosevelt (Mar. 10, 1945), reprinted in Donovan, Regulation of
Insurance Under the McCarran Act, 15 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 473, 478 (1950) (emphasis
added).
100. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). In Parker, the Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act did
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proposition that the Act requires effective state regulation. In
Parker, the Supreme Court held that the antitrust laws would ex-
empt anticompetitive activity only if the state clearly articulates,
actively supervises, and compels adherence to the regulatory
scheme. 101 During the Senate debate, one of the conferees asserted
that the proviso clause embodied the Parker doctrine.10 2 Both the
legislative history and the language of the proviso clause support
this assertion.103 Indeed, the NAIC has said that "[s]ection 2(b) is
essentially an enunciation of the Parker v. Brown decision."
10 4 If
section 2(b) is the embodiment of Parker or simply analogous to it,
then courts should require effective state regulation of the activity,
in contrast to mere legislation, before allowing an insurer's claim of
exemption under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.105
2. The Territorial Limitation on State Regulation
Even if state insurance law effectively regulates insurer activity,
the regulation must be constitutional. In FTC v. Travelers Health
Association,0 " the FTC sought to prohibit the defendant's nation-
wide distribution of deceptive circulars. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the insurer's claim of ex-
emption on the basis of a Nebraska statute regulating unfair and
deceptive insurance practices. 10 7 The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that "the state regulation which Congress provided should
operate to displace [the antitrust laws] means regulation by the
not invalidate a state program aimed at stabilizing raisin prices because the Sherman Act
was not intended to apply to the actions of a state or its officers. Id. at 350-52.
101. Id. at 346-47.
102. 91 CONG. REC. 1480 (1945) (remarks of Sen. O'Mahoney).
103. See generally Weller, supra note 22, at 615-17.
104. NATIONAL ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, MONITORING COMPETITION: A MEANS OF REGULAT-
ING THE PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE BUSINESS 27 n.58 (1974). At least one court has
adopted this view. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 242 F. Supp. 73, 87 (E.D.N.C. 1965) ("Section
2(b) was written into the Act as an enunciation of the Parker v. Brown decision."), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 930 (1966).
105. The Parker doctrine must be applied as a static concept, of course, not in accordance
with its recent interpretations. Otherwise, courts would be giving the doctrine a meaning
unanticipated by Congress.
106. 362 U.S. 293 (1960). The decision resolved a question left open in FTC v. National
Casualty Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958)-whether state regulation could be ineffective because of
constitutional constraints.
107. 262 F.2d 241, 244 (8th Cir. 1959), vacated and remanded, 362 U.S. 293 (1960).
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State in which the [insurer's activity] is practiced and has its im-
pact." 108 Thus, effective state regulation exempts from the anti-
trust laws only insurer activity that is practiced and has its impact
within that state; regulation by a state cannot provide an exemp-
tion for insurer activity occurring beyond its borders.
C. The Boycott Exception
Even if insurer activity is within the business of insurance and
state law effectively regulates it, the activity is not outside the pur-
view of the Sherman Act if it entails a boycott, coercion, or intimi-
dation. Section 3(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that
"[n]othing contained in [this Act] shall render the .. .Sherman
Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimi-
date, or any act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation."10 9 The scope
of the boycott exception is unclear from the language of the Act.
Consequently, a question exists whether the exception applies only
to acts against insurance companies and agents or whether policy-
holders and members of the general public also may take advan-
tage of the exception.
The legislative history of the Act offers little assistance in an-
swering this question. Congress intended the exception to apply to
activity such as that found in South-Eastern Underwriters.110 In
South-Eastern Underwriters, insurance association members at-
tempted to force non-members to join the association by prevent-
ing them from reinsuring their risks, by disparaging their services
and facilities, and by withdrawing support from independent agen-
cies that represented non-members.""' The congressional debates,
however, do not demonstrate whether Congress intended to limit
the exception to such conduct.
108. 362 U.S. at 298-99. Lower courts have applied this rule without great difficulty. See,
e.g., Seasongood v. K & K Ins. Agency, 414 F. Supp. 698 (E.D. Mo. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds, 548 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 242 F.
Supp. 56 (N.D. IM. 1965).
109. 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1976).
110. See 91 CONG. REc. 1485 (1945) (remarks of Sen. O'Mahoney); id. at 1087 (remarks of
Rep. Celler). The drafters of the Act apparently derived the "boycott, coerce, or intimidate"
language of § 3(b) from the Supreme Court's decision in South-Eastern Underwriters. See
322 U.S. 533, 535 (1944).
111. 322 U.S. at 535-36.
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On the basis of this meager legislative history, courts initially
held that section 3(b) applied only to the boycott, coercion, or in-
timidation of insurance companies or agents.1 1 2 In St. Paul Fire &
Marine Insurance Co. v. Barry,11 3 however, the Supreme Court
held that the boycott exception protected other parties as well. In
Barry, Rhode Island physicians had refused to accept an unfavora-
ble change in their malpractice insurance policies.11 4 The other
malpractice insurers in the state refused to insure the physicians,
and the physicians brought suit. On review, the Supreme Court
reasoned that Congress must have intended the terms "boycott,
coercion, and intimidation" to be given their natural meaning
within the context of the Sherman Act. After considering several
possible definitions of the word "boycott",11 5 the Court concluded
that the term included concerted refusals to deal with parties who
were not competitors. The Court also found that the legislative his-
tory of the Act disclosed no congressional intent to limit the
"broad and unqualified" language of section 3(b) to boycotts
112. The first case to interpret the boycott exception was Transnational Ins. Co. v. Rosen-
lund, 261 F. Supp. 12, 26 (D. Or. 1966), which held that Congress' primary purpose in pass-
ing § 3(b) was to protect agents from blacklisting. Relying on Rosenlund, other courts sub-
sequently held that the boycott exception did not apply to suits brought by policyholders or
by the general public. See, e.g., Meicler v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 506 F.2d 732 (5th Cir.
1975); Addrisi v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, 503 F.2d 725 (9th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975); McIlhenny v. American Title Ins. Co., 418 F. Supp.
364 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Mathis v. Automobile Club Inter-Ins. Exch., 410 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D.
Mo. 1976). For a discussion of this early line of cases, see Note, Insurance Regulation and
Antitrust Exemptions: McCarran-Ferguson, the Boycott Exception, and the Public Inter-
est, 27 RUTGERS L. REv. 140 (1973).
113. 438 U.S. 531 (1978).
114. The insurer announced that it would no longer offer coverage on an "occurrence"
basis, which protects the policyholder from liability for any act done while the policy is in
effect, and instead would provide coverage only on a "claims made" basis, which protects
the policyholder only against claims made during the life of the policy. See id. at 535 & n.3.
115. Among the definitions that the Court quoted were: "a method of pressuring a party
with whom one has a dispute by withholding, or enlisting others to withhold, patronage or
services from the target," id. at 541; "combinations of businessmen to 'deprive others of
access to merchandise which the latter wishes to sell to the public,'" id. (quoting United
States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 146 (1966)); "'any agreement by a group of
competitors to boycott a particular buyer or group of buyers,"' id. (quoting FMC v. Aktie-
bolaget Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238, 250 (1968)); and "'concerted refusals by
traders to deal with other traders,'" id. at 543 (quoting Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959)).
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against competitors.11 Accordingly, the Court held that section
3(b) encompassed boycotts of policyholders by the insurance
companies. 117
The Court's decision in Barry, however, fails to define ade-
quately the scope of the "boycott, coercion, and intimidation" lan-
guage of section 3(b).118 Extending the exception to acts against
policyholders creates the danger that the exception, if read too
broadly, will consume all of the exemption granted in section 2 of
the Act. For example, after a state has approved a rate or policy
agreed upon by a group of insurers, members of the public could
challenge the rate or policy under section 3(b), contending that the
insurers implicitly have refused to deal with the general public at
other than the agreed upon price. 119
116. 438 U.S. at 546-50.
117. The Court also noted that state regulation or compulsion might be "a factor to be
considered in the definition of 'boycott' within the meaning of § 3(b)." Id. at 554 n.27. The
footnote implies that the state action doctrine might shield acts of boycott, coercion, or
intimidation. The legislative history of the Act, however, precludes application of the state
action doctrine in such a manner. See 91 CoNG. REc. 481 (1945) (remarks of Sen. Ferguson)
("[I]f ... State law undertook to authorize a boycott, a coercion or an intimidation, or an
agreement to do any one of those three things, then it would be clearly void because Con-
gress would have already spoken.. . ."). See also id. at 1443, 1481, 1483 (remarks of Sens.
Ferguson, McCarran, and Radcliffe).
Section 3(b) also might apply to suits in which insurers allegedly have boycotted trades-
men. See, e.g., Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 440 U.S. 942 (1979).
118. See Carlson, supra note 11, at 1167-68; Note, Policyholder Standing Under the Boy-
cott Exception to the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 10 CoNN. L. REv. 419, 438 (1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Note, Policyholder Standing]; Note, Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
Co.: A Re-Interpretation of the Boycott Exception to the McCarran Act, 1977 DuKE L.J.
1069 [hereinafter cited as Note, A Re-Interpretation].
The Court also did not define "coercion" or "intimidation." Courts generally have not
differentiated between the three terms used in section 3(b). See, e.g., Proctor v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 440 U.S. 942 (1979); Black v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 429 F. Supp. 458, 462
(W.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd mem., 571 F.2d 571 (3d Cir. 1978). But see Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue
Cross of W. Pa., 481 F.2d 80, 84 (3d Cir.) (economic pressure on hospitals to sign with Blue
Cross does not amount to "coercion"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973). Cf. Card v. Na-
tional Life Ins. Co., 603 F.2d 828, 834 (10th Cir. 1979) (summary dismissal of alleged con-
spiracy to terminate insurance agent's contract affirmed because "there was not present the
allegation of coercion").
119. Carlson, supra note 11, at 1168; Note, Policyholder Standing, supra note 118 at 438.
Such a challenge already has occurred. See Anglin v. Blue Shield of Va., 510 F. Supp. 75
(W.D. Va. 1981), aff'd, 693 F.2d 315 (4th Cir. 1982). In addition, two Circuits have noted
that an expansive interpretation of § 3(b) would undermine the exemption granted in § 2.
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Because of this potential danger, commentators have suggested
several approaches to narrow the scope of the boycott exception.
One writer has suggested that courts distinguish between con-
certed refusals to deal at all and concerted refusals to deal except
on particular terms.120 Although this proposal finds some support
in the majority opinion in Barry,12' the Court apparently has re-
jected it. 22 Such a distinction also would foster proliferation of
conditional refusals to deal.123 Another commentator has argued
that the boycott exception should cover only those concerted activ-
ities of insurers that do not further the legitimate purposes of the
Act.124 This proposal is too vague, however, and would require the
courts to speculate whether the activity furthered the goals of the
Act, without adding any certainty to the scope of the exception.
Instead of narrowing the boycott exception, courts should read it
broadly. 25 The various definitions cited by the Court in Barry sug-
gest that a broad reading of section 3(b) is appropriate. 126 A broad
reading also is consistent with Congress' intention to use section
3(b) as a method to prevent coercive insurer activities that would
otherwise be protected by section 2.127 Finally, Congress clearly in-
tended to allow insurers to establish rates and policies on a collec-
See Meicler v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 506 F.2d 732, 734 (5th Cir. 1975); Addrisi v.
Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, 503 F.2d 725, 729 (9th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975).
120. Carlson, supra note 11, at 1168.
121. The majority stated several times in the opinion that the facts of the case consti-
tuted a refusal to deal on any terms. See 438 U.S. at 533, 535, 540, 544, 552, 553. In addi-
tion, the Court noted that its holding should not be read to mean "that all concerted activ-
ity violative of the Sherman Act comes within § 3(b)." Id. at 555.
122. See id. at 542. Commentators developed the distinction between "refusals to deal on
any terms" and "refusals to deal except on certain terms" to distinguish between boycotts
that warrant per se illegality and those that do not. This distinction is not relevant to a
consideration of the scope of § 3(b) because the legality of the insurer's activity is consid-
ered apart from whether the activity comes within the boycott exception. See Sullivan &
Wiley, supra note 71, at 277-78.
123. Note, Policyholder Standing, supra note 118, at 443.
124. Note, A Re-Interpretation, supra note 118, at 1083-85.
125. Accord Sullivan & Wiley, supra note 71, at 278-80; Note, Policyholder Standing,
supra note 118, at 445-46. Sullivan and Wiley argue that the boycott exception of the Act
should apply to "the employment of substantial unregulated economic power by insurance
industry members." Sullivan & Wiley, supra note 71, at 279 (emphasis deleted). Courts also
should read "coercion" and "intimidation" broadly.
126. See supra note 115.
127. See 438 U.S. at 549 (quoting 91 CONG. REC. 1483, 1486 (1945)).
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tive basis, as long as the states regulated such activity. '28 Courts,
therefore, should heed the legislative intent and not allow the pub-
lic to challenge rate and policymaking activity under the boycott
exception.
IV. APPLYING THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT TO INSURER
ACTIVITIES
The McCarran-Ferguson Act has been applied principally to
protect concerted rate-making by insurers where the necessary
state regulation exists. The majority of antitrust cases involving
the exemption have concerned intra-industry trade restraints
within the business of insurance. With increasing frequency, how-
ever, courts are being asked to apply the exemption to cases in-
volving inter-industry restraints.
This section of the Article applies the framework developed in
the previous section to those insurer activities that frequently are
challenged in the courts, and determines whether those activities
fall within the scope of the exemption. Four broad categories en-
compass the practices under consideration: provider arrangements;
benefit and "usual, customary, and reasonable" fee schedules; ty-
ing arrangements; and activities concerning the insurer-agent rela-
tionship. 29 The first two practices involve inter-industry restraints
that insurers have developed to contain costs. The third and fourth
practices involve primarily intra-industry restraints that tradition-
ally have been considered within the exemption. A review of the
status of these practices under the exemption is needed, however,
in light of the Supreme Court's recent decisions construing the
scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Application of the frame-
work to each of these four categories indicates that the McCarran-
128. See 91 CONG. REC. 1481 (1945) (remarks of Sen. Ferguson); id. at 1483 (remarks of
Sen. Radcliffe). At least one court has held that rate-setting by an insurer falls within the
exemption. See Thomsen v. Sun Co., 498 F. Supp. 1109, 1111-12 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
129. Other insurer activities have been challenged, but those activities are so far beyond
the scope of the exemption that they were not considered within the business of insurance
even before Royal Drug. See, e.g., United States v. Crocker Natl Corp., 656 F.2d 428 (9th
Cir. 1981) (dictum) (interlocking directorates); American Gen. Ins. Co. v. FTC, 359 F. Supp.
887 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (mergers between insurance companies), aff'd, 496 F.2d 197 (5th Cir.
1974); DeVoto v. Pacific Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 354 F. Supp. 874 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (customer
list agreements), rev'd on other grounds, 516 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 894
(1975).
1983]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Ferguson Act offers only a limited exemption from the antitrust
laws. The exemption is limited primarily because of the Supreme
Court's restrictive tests for determining whether an activity is
within the "business of insurance."
A. Provider Arrangements
Provider arrangements generally are contractual agreements be-
tween an insurer and third parties for the provision of goods and
services to the insurer's policyholders.130 The agreement allows the
policyholder to receive specified goods or services from the pro-
vider, usually at a nominal fee. The insurer then pays the provider
any remaining cost.
Provider arrangements are either closed-panel or open-panel.
Under a closed-panel arrangement, the policyholder must go to a
participating provider to receive the benefit of the provider agree-
ment. If the policyholder goes to a non-participating provider, he
will have to pay the full price for the goods or services and will not
receive reimbursement from the insurer. In contrast, under an
open-panel arrangement, the policyholder may choose whether to
go to a participating provider. If he goes to a non-participating
provider, he must pay the full price for the goods or services. The
policyholder then files a claim with the insurer to obtain reim-
bursement, usually in an amount less favorable than if the policy-
holder had gone to a participating provider." 1
130. Provider arrangements also may be informal, with the insurer simply referring claim-
ants to certain providers. See e.g., Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 660 F.2d 1195
(7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982). The informal nature of the arrangement
does not alter the applicability of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. See Note, supra note 74, at
1485-86.
131. The operation of an open-panel provider arrangement is illustrated by the following
example:
Suppose the usual and customary retail price for a quantity of Drug X charged
by both "participating" Pharmacy A and "non-participating" Pharmacy B is
$10.00, and the wholesale price (or acquisition cost) to both is $8.00. If an in-
sured buys Drug X from Pharmacy A, the insured pays $2.00. Pharmacy A
receives $2.00 from the insured and $8.00 from Blue Shield, or $10.00 total. If
an insured buys Drug X from Pharmacy B, the insured pays Pharmacy B
$10.00, and receives $6.00 (75 percent of the difference between the retail price
and $2.00) from Blue Shield. While Pharmacy B receives the same as Phar-
macy A, the insured must pay $4.00 for the drug and also must take steps to
obtain reimbursement.
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Before 1979, courts consistently held that the McCarran-Fergu-
son Act exempted provider arrangements from the antitrust
laws. 13 2 In Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug
Co., 33 however, the Supreme Court held that an open-panel pro-
vider arrangement between an insurer and pharmacies was not
within the "business of insurance." In reaching this conclusion, the
Court noted that provider arrangements "do not involve any un-
derwriting or spreading of risk, but are merely arrangements for
the purchase of goods and services by [the insurer].' 34 Such ar-
rangements may enable the insurer to minimize its costs and
thereby reduce premiums, but that affects only the magnitude of
an insurer's potential payment, not the probability of payment
which is an essential element of the risk-spreading requirement. 3 5
Furthermore, provider arrangements do not affect the insurer-in-
sured relationship directly because the arrangements are distinct
from the insurer's contract with its policyholders. Although the
cost savings produced by such arrangements may have an indirect
effect upon the insurer-insured relationship, virtually every busi-
ness decision made by an insurer has an indirect effect upon the
policyholder. Finally, because provider arrangements are inter-in-
dustry in character, Congress did not intend the arrangements to
be exempt under the Act. Accordingly, lower courts since Royal
Drug have held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act exempts neither
closed-panel nor open-panel provider arrangements from the anti-
trust laws.136
If the pharmacy's acquisition cost for the drug is $5.00 rather than $8.00, the
situation of Pharmacy B and the insured are unchanged. But now Pharmacy A
will receive only $5.00 from Blue Shield, for a total of $7.00.
Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 209 n.3 (1979) (quoting from
the brief for the United States as amicus curiae).
132. See, e.g., Doctors, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 431 F. Supp. 5 (E.D.
Pa. 1975), aff'd per curiam, 557 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1976); Holly Springs Funeral Home, Inc.
v. United Funeral Serv. Inc., 303 F. Supp. 128 (N.D. Miss. 1969); Hill v. National Auto Glass
Co., 293 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
133. 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
134. Id. at 214.
135. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 86 (1982); Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982); United States v. Title Ins. Rating Bureau of
Ariz., 517 F. Supp. 1053 (D. Ariz. 1981). But see Hahn v. Oregon Physicians' Serv., 508 F.
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B. Benefit and "Usual, Customary, and Reasonable" Fee
Schedules
Some insurance policies provide that policyholders will be in-
demnified according to a schedule of payments. The benefit sched-
ule usually is fixed by the insurer and minimizes claim costs by
establishing maximum prices for provider services. Similarly,
under a "usual, customary, and reasonable" (UCR) fee schedule,
insurers indemnify policyholders only for the reasonable costs aris-
ing out of an insured event, rather than the entire loss. Typically, a
"peer review" committee implements the UCR fee schedule by de-
termining whether the fees charged by a provider are reasonable. 1 7
Immediately following Royal Drug, two United States Circuit
Courts of Appeal considered for the first time the applicability of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act to peer review and the UCR fee
schedules. Focusing solely upon the insurer-insured relationship
test of Royal Drug, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the Act
shielded such activity from scrutiny under the antitrust laws. 138
Supp. 970, 974 (D. Or. 1981), rev'd, 689 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1982). The court in Hahn distin-
guished the case before it from Royal Drug on the basis that the provider arrangement
involved was a part of the insurance contract. The Supreme Court's subsequent decision in
Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 102 S. Ct. 3002, 3009 (1982), may provide some support
for this approach. Provider arrangements that are a part of an insurance contract, however,
satisfy only one of the tests used to define the business of insurance. Those arrangements
satisfy the insurer-insured relationship test, but fail to satisfy either the spreading of risk or
the conformity to legislative intent tests. See supra text accompanying notes 46-68.
137. See generally Kallstrom, Health Care Cost Control by Third Party Payors: Fee
Schedules and the Sherman Act, 1978 DuKE L.J. 645. These two types of fee schedules are
tied closely to provider arrangements and are typically included in them.
Peer review may be requested by an insurer or compelled by law. In either event, a group
or committee of providers conducts the review. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395(f) (1976 & Supp.
M 1979); id. at § 1396(a)(3) (1976); N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW §§ 13-a, 13-g (McKinney 1965
& Supp. 1981); N.Y. INS. LAW § 678 (McKinney 1966 & Supp. 1981). Only voluntary peer
review presents potential antitrust problems. Mandatory peer review is exempt from the
antitrust laws under both the state action doctrine and the doctrine of implied repeal. See
Borsody & Tiano, Peer Review and the Antitrust Laws: An Analysis and A Proposal, 26 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 511, 513-17 (1982).
138. Bartholomew v. Virginia Chiropractors Ass'n, 612 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. de-
nied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980). The defendant maintained a peer review committee which re-
viewed claims submitted to various insurers for chiropractic services. The committee deter-
mined the usual and customary fees for such services, and the insurer then reimbursed the
policyholder for that amount. The court held that because "the sole parties to the system
were the insured and the insurer," the review procedure "touched upon 'the business of
insurance,'" and therefore was within the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Id. at 817.
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The Second Circuit, however, focused primarily on the underwrit-
ing or spreading of risk requirement and reached the opposite con-
clusion, holding that the Act does not exempt such activity."'
On review of the Second Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court
in Union Labor Life Insurance Co. v. Pireno1 40 resolved the con-
flict. The Court held that the peer review used to implement UCR
fee schedules is not within the business of insurance. Applying the
three-prong Royal Drug test, the Court first observed that such ac-
tivity did not underwrite or spread risk. Rather, the insurance pol-
icy itself had already effected the transfer of risk. Moreover, the
Court noted that peer review does not transfer the risk of unrea-
sonable charges back to the insured because the risk was never
transferred to the insurer.14 1 The Court, therefore, concluded that
the review process failed to satisfy the risk-spreading requirement.
The Court also found that the activity did not satisfy the insurer-
insured relationship requirement because the procedure was dis-
tinct from the insurance contract between the insurer and its poli-
See Ratino v. Medical Serv. of D.C., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 164,144 (D. Md. 1981) (hold-
ing on the basis of Bartholomew that a UCR system was within the business of insurance).
In Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Va., 624 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981), the Fourth Circuit retreated somewhat from its
position in Bartholomew. In Virginia Academy, the insurer required that psychologists sub-
mit their bills to physicians. If the reviewing physician deemed the charges reasonable, the
insurer would pay the psychologist directly. In reviewing this procedure, the court, as in
Bartholomew, focused on the insurer-insured relationship, but found that the procedure was
"only tangential to that relationship in that it does not affect the benefit conferred upon the
[insured]." Id. at 483. The court held that because the insurer did not deny coverage for
psychological treatment, as opposed to psychiatric treatment, and therefore had not decided
against underwriting psychological treatment, any cost savings arising out of the review pro-
cedure were not sufficiently a part of the insurer-insured relationship. Id. at 484. The court
indicated that Bartholomew simply held that the essence of the business of insurance is the
insurer-insured relationship, id. at 483, but did not overrule that decision specifically. Judge
Hall, who dissented in Bartholomew, authored the opinion in Virginia Academy.
139. Pireno v. New York State Chiropractic Ass'n, 650 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1981), afl'd sub
nom. Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 102 S. Ct. 3002 (1982). The Second Circuit stated
that the review process does nothing more than
determine whether the risk of the entire loss . . . has been transferred to the
insurer-that is, whether the insured's loss falls within the policy limits. Peer
review is thus not a means of transferring risk from insured to insurer. At
most, it is an aid in determining the scope of the transfer after it has been
made.
650 F.2d at 393.
140. 102 S. Ct. 3002 (1982).
141. Id. at 3009.
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cyholders. Like provider arrangements, the practice only affects an
insurer's potential costs and the magnitude of its potential pay-
ments. Finally, peer review procedures involve parties outside the
insurance industry, and are therefore beyond the scope of congres-
sional intent.
Only one court has considered whether fixed-benefit schedules
are within the business of insurance. In Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medial Society,142 the defendant set maximum fees that
physicians could receive for services rendered to policyholders. The
district court held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act was inapplica-
ble on the ground that the benefit schedule did not underwrite or
spread risk. The court stated that "[m]erely because an insurance
company acts to reduce the risk that it has underwritten does not
directly further underwrite or spread the risk that the policyhold-
ers sought to insure against.'
'1 43
The analysis used by the Court in Pireno confirms that fixed-
benefit schedules are not within the business of insurance and that
the decision in Maricopa County is correct. Like a UCR fee sched-
ule, a fixed-benefit schedule affects only the magnitude of the in-
surer's risk-not its probability. Moreover, benefit schedules are
separate from the insurance contract and thus do not affect the
insurer-insured relationship directly. Finally, because benefit
schedules involve parties outside the insurance industry, Congress
could not have intended to exempt the schedules under the Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Act.
Despite the above analysis, not all benefit schedules are subject
to the antitrust laws. If the risk being insured against is other than
the risk of having to pay a provider for his services, then the bene-
fit schedules associated with such a policy are within the business
of insurance. For example, automobile liability insurance insures
against the risk of a judgment against the policyholder arising out
of the use of a car, and typically sets an upper limit on the cover-
age for various types of accidents."" Generally though, the McCar-
142. 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,694 (D. Ariz. 1979), aff'd, 643 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1980),
rev'd on other grounds, 457 U.S. 332 (1982). In Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 592
F.2d 1191 (1st Cir. 1979), the court did not decide the applicability of the Act to a fee
schedule because of pending state cases that could affect its decision.
143. 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,694, at 77,894.
144. Note, supra note 74, at 1489. Other examples include life insurance and disability
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ran-Ferguson Act does not exempt fixed-benefit and UCR fee
schedules from the antitrust laws.
C. Tying Arrangements
A tying arrangement exists whenever a seller stipulates that he
will sell a product or service-the tying product-only on the con-
dition that the consumer also purchase another, often less desired,
product or service-the tied product. These arrangements violate
the Clayton and Sherman Acts if: the tying and tied products are
distinct; the seller possesses an appreciable degree of power in the
market for the tying product; and the arrangement affects more
than an insubstantial amount of commerce in the tied product.145
Tying arrangements involving insurance can be grouped into
three categories. The first category ties one type of insurance to
another. The second category ties insurance to a non-insurance
product, while the third category ties a non-insurance product to
insurance.
Prior to Royal Drug, only one court had examined the tying of
insurance to another insurance product. In McIlhenny v. American
Title Insurance Co.,14 the defendant tied the purchase of mechan-
ic's lien insurance to the purchase of title insurance. The court
held that this practice was part of the business of insurance, noting
that the tying arrangement went to the "very heart of the relation-
ship between the insurance company and the policyholder' 147 be-
cause, unless the plaintiff agreed to buy both mechanic's lien insur-
ance and title insurance, the defendant would not insure him.
No court has examined this type of tying arrangement since
Royal Drug.14 The arrangement, however, appears to be within
the business of insurance. It indicates that the insurer has decided
insurance.
145. See Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
955 (1972). See generally United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. 610 (1977);
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
146. 418 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
147. Id. at 369.
148. In Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 662 F.2d 641 (9th
Cir. 1981), the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had tied the purchase of its drug insur-
ance plan to the purchase of its health insurance plan. The district court held that this
arrangement was within the business of insurance. The Ninth Circuit, however, vacated and
remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration in light of Royal Drug. Id. at 647.
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to cover only a broad class of risks insured by two insurance prod-
ucts, rather than a narrow class insured by a single insurance prod-
uct. As such, it represents a spreading of risks that affects the
probability of the insurer having to make a payment.149 As the
court in McIlhenny noted, the arrangement directly affects the in-
surer-insured relationship. Finally, because the arrangement ties
one insurance product to another, it is entirely intra-industry in
character, thus conforming to congressional intent.150
Most courts that considered the tying arrangements in the sec-
ond and third categories before Royal Drug held that the arrange-
ments were within the business of insurance. For example, in Ad-
drisi v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States,151
the Ninth Circuit held that the practice of tying life insurance to
mortgage loans was within the business of insurance. Similarly, the
court in Mathis v. Automobile Club Inter-Insurance Exchange152
held that the practice of tying automobile club membership to the
issuance of auto insurance was exempt under the McCarran-Fergu-
son Act. Courts generally had agreed that such arrangements were
activities affecting the insurer-insured relationship and, therefore,
within the busines of insurance.153
Tying arrangements in these two categories, however, fail two of
the three stringent requirements announced in Royal Drug. Be-
cause the insurer will not insure anyone who does not agree to the
tying arrangement, the arrangement has a direct effect upon the
insurer-insured relationship, satisfying one prong of the Royal
Drug test. Such arrangements, however, fail the remaining two
prongs because they necessarily involve parties outside the insur-
ance industry, and because they do more than spread risk.154 Tying
149. See Note, supra note 74, at 1490.
150. A court should consider the particular facts of each case in determining whether the
state has regulated the tying arrangement effectively and whether the arrangement falls
within the § 3(b) exception.
151. 503 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975).
152. 410 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
153. See, e.g., Dexter v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, 527 F.2d 233
(2d Cir. 1975); Schwartz v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 374 F. Supp. 564 (E.D. Pa.)
(court deferred granting motion for summary judgment), 384 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1974);
Seasongood v. K & K Ins. Agency, 414 F. Supp. 698 (E.D. Mo. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds, 548 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1977).
154. See Note, supra note 74, at 1490-91.
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arrangements in these two categories include the sale of a non-in-
surance product, and thus involve more than just an agreement to
assume a class of risks in return for the payment of a premium, or
a decision by an insurer to cover only a certain class of risks. Both
types of tying arrangements, therefore, are outside the business of
insurance and may be scrutinized under the antitrust laws.
D. Activities Concerning the Insurer-Agent Relationship
Before Royal Drug, courts were divided on the issue of whether
activities involving the insurer-agent relationship were within the
scope of section 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Such activi-
ties include employment or agency contracts and-the fixing of com-
missions. Some courts had held that these activities were exempt
from antitrust scrutiny;155 other courts had focused on the insurer-
insured relationship test of National Securities and concluded
that the insurer-agent relationship was outside the business of
insurance. 156
The Supreme Court in Royal Drug considered, but did not de-
cide, whether the insurer-agent relationship is within the business
of insurance. 157 Several lower courts, however, have addressed the
issue. In Thompson v. New York Life Insurance Co.,' an insur-
ance agent asserted that his employment contract violated the an-
titrust laws because the contract prohibited him from engaging in
any other occupation for remuneration without the written consent
of his employer. The court focused on the insurer-insured relation-
ship test and found that, because the defendant did not force the
plaintiff to engage in activities unrelated to insurance, the contract
sufficiently affected the insurer-insured relationship to fall within
the business of insurance.' 59 In Mac Adjustment, Inc. v. General
155. See, e.g., Lawyer's Realty Corp. v. Peninsular Title Ins. Co., 428 F. Supp. 1288 (E.D.
La.), af'd per curiam, 550 F.2d 1035 (5th Cir. 1977); California League of Ind. Ins. Provid-
ers v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 175 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
156. See, e.g., Ray v. United Family Life Ins. Co., 430 F. Supp. 1353 (W.D.N.C. 1977);
Allied Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 418 F. Supp. 157 (D. Neb. 1976).
157. 440 U.S. at 224 n.32.
158. 644 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1981).
159. Id. at 442-44. Other courts have reached similar results based on the insurer-insured
relationship test. See, e.g., Card v. National Life Ins. Co., 603 F.2d 828 (10th Cir. 1979). See
also Steinberg v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 486 F. Supp. 122 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (relying on
Black v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 429 F. Supp. 458 (W.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 571 F.2d 571 (3d
1983]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Adjustment Bureau, Inc.,160 the court reached a contrary result. In
Mac Adjustment, an insurance adjuster brought suit, alleging that
the defendant insurance companies had conspired to force him out
of business. In an unreported opinion, the district court concluded
that the relationship between the adjuster and the insurer was not
within the business of insurance for the purpose of asserting an
exemption under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Although this as-
pect of the judgment was not appealed, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit implicitly questioned the soundness
of the lower court's conclusion.
Decisions holding that the insurer-agent relationship is within
the business of insurance are inconsistent with the 'Supreme
Court's analysis in Royal Drug. Although such activity may be nec-
essary to conduct the business of insurance companies, the insurer-
agent relationship generally does not involve the underwriting or
spreading of risk.1 1 Furthermore, the type of employment contract
or commission schedule that an agent has affects only the expenses
of the insurer. This type of indirect effect upon the insurer-insured
relationship is insufficient under Royal Drug.
Decisions that place the insurer-agent relationship outside the
business of insurance, however, appear to be inconsistent with con-
gressional intent. The NAIC proposal and bills introduced before
the South-Eastern Underwriters decision specifically exempted ac-
tivities involving the insurer-agent relationship. 16 2 Although the
exemption as enacted did not mention explicitly the insurer-agent
relationship, the language of section 3(b) supports inclusion of the
relationship within the exemption.16 If sections 2 and 3(b) are
read together, one can infer that, by including the insurer-insured
relationship within section 3(b), Congress also must have consid-
ered the insurer-agent relationship to be within the business of
Cir. 1978)).
160. 597 F.2d 1318 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 929 (1979).
161. Two exceptions that the courts have recognized are the authorization of agents to
solicit individual or group policies, and the acceptance or rejection of coverage tendered by
brokers. See Owens v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 654 F.2d 218 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981). Such activity also must satisfy the state regulation and non-boycott re-
quirements to fall within the scope of the exemption.
162. See H.R. 444, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944); 90 CONG. REc. A4406 (1944).
163. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
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insurance.
The majority in Royal Drug apparently recognized this argu-
ment1 " and intimated, as the dissent pointed out, "that such
transactions, between insurers and agents, might fall within the
'business of insurance,' despite the inconsistency with the [major-
ity's] theory. '165 Recognition of such an exception to the Court's
three-prong test would not render section 3(b) superfluous with re-
gard to activities involving the insurer-agent relationship. More-
over, such an exception would be consistent with the broad reading
of section 3(b) suggested earlier. 66 Therefore, courts should con-
sider the insurer-agent relationship to be within the business of
insurance as an exception to the Royal Drug test. Courts should
not attempt to fit this activity within the three criteria, lest they
unwittingly broaden the test's narrow scope.
V. ANTITRUST SCRUTINY OF INSURER ACTIvITIES BEYOND THE SCOPE
OF THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT
Courts faced with activities beyond the scope of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act still must determine the legality of those activities
under the antitrust laws. This section examines the problem by fo-
cusing on the legality of fixed-benefit and UCR fee schedules and
provider arrangements. Because these schedules and arrangements
are recent developments, the appropriate standard of antitrust re-
view is unsettled. In contrast, tying arrangements and activities in-
volving the insurer-agent relationship that do not fall within the
scope of the Act are fairly traditional from an antitrust perspec-
tive, and so may be scrutinized using the appropriate standards of
review.
A. Antitrust Scrutiny of Fee Schedules
For purposes of antitrust scrutiny, fee schedules may be classi-
fied into two categories depending upon whether provider domina-
tion of the insurer exists. In the first category, the providers that
supply the goods or services to which the fee schedule pertains also
164. See 440 U.S. at 224 n.32.
165. Id. at 245 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
166. See supra notes 109-128 and accompanying text.
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comprise or dominate the insurer. This arrangement may arise
when the insurer is a Foundation for Medical Care (FMC)16 7 or
Blue Cross/Blue Shield,' both of which are either comprised of,
or dominated by, providers. In contrast, under independent insurer
fee schedules, an independent insurer fixes either a benefit or UCR
fee schedule and obtains provider adherence to the schedule; prov-
iders do not dominate or control the insurer.
1. Provider-Dominated Fee Schedules
The establishment of a benefit or UCR fee schedule by an in-
surer dominated or controlled by a provider is a classic example of
horizontal price-fixing. The prices being fixed, however, are maxi-
mum prices, not minimum prices. Despite this distinction, the Su-
preme Court recently held in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Society' that such fee schedules are illegal per se.
In Maricopa County, Arizona challenged a benefit schedule fixed
by Maricopa, an FMC, as illegal per se. Both the district court and
the Ninth Circuit, however, concluded that the activity should be
evaluated under the rule of reason.i70 In a split decision, the Su-
preme Court reversed the lower courts, noting that the Court pre-
viously had declared that maximum price-fixing agreements were
167. Medical societies manage or sponsor FMCs which provide prepaid health care. The
member providers offer a complete line of medical services to subscribers on the basis of an
annual participation fee. See Kallstrom, supra note 137, at 680.
168. Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans historically have maintained close ties with the medical
profession. Id. at 682. Indeed, the medical profession originally sponsored the development
of Blue Cross/Blue Shield. See Millman, Cost Containment Efforts by Private Health In-
surers: Antitrust Implications and A Proposal for Legislative Reform, 31 FED. INS. COUNS.
361, 363 (1981). Providers of medical care frequently dominate the governing bodies of Blue
Cross/Blue Shield. The Blue Cross/Blue Shield programs thus are quite similar to FMCs.
169. 457 U.S. 332 (1982). Prior to Maricopa County, the Supreme Court and Congress
had expressed concern over the anticompetitive potential of provider-dominated fee sched-
ules. See Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 232 n.40 (1979);
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Skyrocketing Health Care Costs: The Role of Blue
Shield, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-34 (1978).
170. See 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,694 (D. Ariz. 1979), aff'd, 643 F.2d 553 (9th Cir.
1980), rev'd, 457 U.S. 332 (1982). The Ninth Circuit reasoned that because fee schedules
were such a recent development, the full effect of those schedules had not been determined
sufficiently to label them illegal per se. 643 F.2d at 556-58. See infra text accompanying note
187.
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unlawful per se.171 Although the Court recognized that its previous
decisions involved primarily vertical maximum price-fixing, the
Court reasoned that those cases involved a sufficient degree of hor-
izontal price-fixing to include Maricopa's fixed-benefit schedule.7 2
Thus, the Court's prior "decisions foreclose[d] the argument that
the agreements at issue escape per se condemnation because they
are horizontal and fix maximum prices.' ' 73
The Supreme Court reached a correct conclusion in Maricopa
County.17 4 Fee schedules established by provider-dominated insur-
ers easily fall within the Court's per se prohibition of horizontal
price-fixing. Furthermore, an anticompetitive potential exists with
provider-dominated benefit and UCR fee schedules because the
maximum price ceilings may become minimum prices. 175 Providers,
however, may be encouraged to set their charges at the maximum
price fixed in the fee schedule. 17  Although ostensibly serving as a
maximum price ceiling, the fee schedule easily could become a
minimum price floor that allows providers to raise prices each time
171. 457 U.S. at 346-47 (citing Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) and Kiefer-
Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951)). This conclusion fol-
lowed from the Court's decision in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,
223 (1940) (any "combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depress-
ing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing. . . price[s] ... is illegal per se"). See also Catalano, Inc.
v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (per curiam) (reaffirming the Court's position that
horizontal price-fixing is illegal per se).
172. 457 U.S. at 348 n.18.
173. Id. at 348. The Court also rejected the following arguments: that the defendants'
professional status should influence the outcome of the case, id.; that the Court should not
apply a per se rule because the judiciary has little experience in the health care industry, id.
at 349 (noting that the type of restraint challenged-horizontal price-fixing-was well
known to the courts); and that the fee schedules involved price-fixing only in the literal
sense, id. at 356-57.
The dissent criticized the majority for holding illegal per se a plan that appeared to be in
the public interest and which, on the basis of the incomplete record before the Court, could
not be shown to reduce competition. The dissenters also questioned the propriety of the
majority's conclusion that the fee schedules involved something more than price-fixing in
the literal sense. See id. at 357-67 (Powell, J., dissenting).
174. See also'Kallstrom, supra note 137, at 683 (arguing that provider-dominated fee
schedules should be illegal per se). But see Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. CHI.
L. REv. 886 (1981) (arguing that not all maximum price-fixing should be considered unlaw-
ful per se).
175. Kallstrom, supra note 137, at 650-52, 682-83. See Easterbrook, supra note 174, at
900-04. Prof. Easterbrook effectively refutes other allegedly anticompetitive effects of maxi-
mum price-fixing. See id. at 904-08.
176. Kallstrom, supra note 137, at 650.
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the fee schedule is revised. Evidence exists that this has happened
with some Blue Shield plans. 17 7 Because the provider controls or
dominates the insurer, no real incentive exists to hold down fees.
Although the practice may result in the loss of some policyholders,
the price-insensitive nature of health care should easily offset the
losses. As the Supreme Court stated, "[e]ven if a fee schedule is
[otherwise] desirable, it is not necessary that the [providers] do the
price fixing.' 7 8
Finally, parties also have challenged the peer review procedures
used to implement UCR fee schedules as violations of the antitrust
laws. 7 9 This issue was not before the Supreme Court in either
Pireno or Maricopa County.'80 Like the UCR fee schedule itself,
provider-dominated peer review procedures also should be unlaw-
ful per se because they are used to implement the fee schedule. In
addition, if a plaintiff could show that the providers used the peer
review procedure as part of a conspiracy to boycott, coerce, or in-
timidate the plaintiff, the review procedure would be illegal per se
as a group boycott.' 8'
2. Independent-Insurer Fee Schedules
The setting of a benefit or UCR fee schedule by an independent
insurer is not a form of horizontal price-fixing because no horizon-
tally concerted action occurs. Rather, such practices constitute ver-
177. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Skyrocketing Health Care Costs: The Role of
Blue Shield, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-34 (1978).
178. 457 U.S. at 352.
179. See, e.g., Pireno v. New York State Chiropractic Ass'n, 650 F.2d 387, 389 (2d Cir.
1981), af'd sub nom. Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 102 S. Ct. 3002 (1982); Virginia
Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Va., 624 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981).
180. Pireno, 102 S. Ct. at 3007 ("in deciding this case we have no occasion to address the
merits of respondent's Sherman Act claims."); Maricopa County, 457 U.S. at 340 ("No chal-
lenge is made to [the defendant's] peer review ... -).
181. See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Origina-
tors' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). Lower courts, however, have applied
the per se rule only when the evidence establishes that the defendant intended to boycott,
coerce, or intimidate. See, e.g., Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National Bankamericard, Inc.,
485 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1974); E.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour Manual
Comm., 467 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973); Chastain v. Ameri-
can Tel. & Tel. Co., 401 F. Supp. 151 (D.D.C. 1975).
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tical price-fixing. The Supreme Court in Maricopa County did not
determine the validity of independent insurer-instituted fee
schedules.1i 2
Insurer-instituted fee schedules parallel the activity involved in
Albrecht v. Herald Co."s' and Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, Inc. 4 In those cases, the Supreme Court de-
clared that maximum resale price maintenance was illegal per se.185
Insurer-instituted fee schedules resemble maximum resale price
maintenance in that the insurer sets the maximum price that prov-
iders can charge for their services. Providers, however, are not
forced to charge the maximum price. In exchange, the providers
receive additional business from the insurer's policyholders.
As in Maricopa County, the Court may feel bound by its estab-
lished rule that vertical maximum price-fixing is illegal per se. The
Court, however, should distinguish independent-insurer fee sched-
ules from provider-dominated fee schedules and apply the rule of
reason because "[m]aximum [vertical] price fixing has none of the
potential anticompetitive consequences of horizontal maximum
price fixing .. ."186
Under the rule of reason, courts must balance the anticompeti-
tive and procompetitive effects of the restraint on trade to deter-
mine the restraint's legality. 1 7 Although the restraint may be in-
182. 457 U.S. at 352 n.26.
183. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
184. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
185. Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 153; Kiefer-Stewart, 340 U.S. at 213. Neither decision explic-
itly enunciated a per se rule, although the Court's language and approach in both cases
suggested such a rule. See also Maricopa County, 457 U.S. at 346-47 (stating that maximum
price-fixing is illegal per se). Commentators have argued that neither Albrecht nor Kiefer-
Stewart should be read as holding that maximum price maintenance is unlawful per se. See
generally Kallstrom, supra note 137, at 665-68. The Supreme Court in Continental T.V.,
Inc., v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.18 (1977), however, reaffirmed the per se ille-
gality of vertical price restraints.
186. Easterbrook, supra note 174, at 890 n.20. The Supreme Court also has indicated that
Albrecht and Kiefer-Stewart need to be reexamined. See Maricopa County, 457 U.S. at 352
n.26; Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 210 n.5. Maricopa and Royal Drug did not determine the
legality of maximum price-fixing arrangements instituted by independent insurers. See also
infra notes 206-09 and accompanying text (suggesting several distinctions between provider
arrangements and resale price maintenance).
187. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688-92
(1978). The classic statement of the rule of reason is:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
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tended to serve a laudable purpose, such as providing low-cost
medical care, the intent is irrelevant.18 Under this analysis, in-
surer-instituted fee schedules should not be considered unlawful
because the schedules are not anticompetitive, and actually have
several procompetitive effects.
Vertical maximum price-fixing reduces search costs by allowing
consumers and insurance companies to identify low-price sellers. 89
Because of the high costs involved in consulting various doctors,
health care consumers rarely attempt to determine who will pro-
vide care at the lowest cost. Identification of low-cost providers,
therefore, should increase competition among health care provid-
ers, reducing the cost of medical services. Vertical maximum price-
fixing also reduces transaction costs.190 Consumers generally are
unable to negotiate with health care providers over the cost of ser-
vices. Fee schedules allow insurers to negotiate impassionately with
providers and set reasonable prices for health care. Fee schedules
also can "create a new product" by eliminating any incentive for
providers to supply unwarranted or costly services to naive
consumers.I9
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as
may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the
court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the
restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed;
the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the
restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular rem-
edy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not
because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the
reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts
and to predict consequences.
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
188. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. at 696; Com-
ment, Prepaid Prescription Drug Plans Under Antitrust Scrutiny: A Stern Challenge to
Health Care Cost Containment, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 506, 527 (1980). But cf. Havighurst &
Kissam, The Antitrust Implication of Relative Value Studies in Medicine, 4 J. HEALTH
POL., POL'Y & L. 48, 67 (1979); Horan & Nord, Application of Antitrust Law to the Health
Care Delivery System, 9 CuM. L. REv. 684, 686 (1979) (both articles attempt to weigh the
importance of health care policies served by provider arrangements in the balancing test
that is used to determine reasonableness).
189. Easterbrook, supra note 174, at 892-95. See also Rosoff, supra note 3, at 447.
190. Easterbook, supra note 174, at 895-98. See also Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1979) (pointing out that a blanket licensing system
reduced transaction costs).
191. Easterbook, supra note 174, at 898-900. For a discussion of other procompetitive
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Independent insurers, unlike provider-dominated insurers, have
an incentive to keep maximum prices down. By lowering the fees
paid for provider services, the insurer will lower its benefit pay-
ments and increase its profits. Policyholder premiums also may de-
crease. In addition, independent insurers do not force the provider
to charge a certain price. The provider may charge any price so
long as it is at or below the maximum established by the insurer.
These factors mitigate against maximum fees becoming minimum
prices.192
Challenges to the peer review procedures instituted with UCR
fee schedules also must be considered. If the peer review commit-
tee members are all competitors, and if their determination of
what constitutes a reasonable fee is binding, then the review proce-
dure qualifies as horizontal maximum price-fixing. 193 Maricopa
County indicates that the procedure is unlawful per se. If the peer
review procedure is voluntary, however, and the committee's rec-
ommendations are not binding on any of the parties involved, then
the procedure could not be challenged as an unlawful form of
price-fixing. Indeed, a business review letter by the United States
Department of Justice and a recent decision by the Second Circuit
have suggested that a nonbinding voluntary procedure would be
lawful."" Finally, if a plaintiff can show that the peer review proce-
dure is part of a concerted refusal to deal, the procedure would be
unlawful. 95
effects of vertical price-fixing, see R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 435-39 (1978); R. Pos-
NER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 158 (1976).
192. Adoption of the rule of reason in cases of fee schedules instituted by independent
insurers does not mean that such fee schedules are lawful per se. If a plaintiff can show that
the maximum price fee schedule is actually a guise for minimum price-fixing, the fee sched-
ule should be invalidated as an unreasonable restraint of trade. For a discussion of the ways
this can be proven, see Easterbook, supra note 174, at 901-03.
193. See Borsody & Tiano, supra note 137, at 524.
194. The Antitrust Division approved a peer review procedure that was performed at the
request of insurance companies and was not binding on any party. The Antitrust Division
emphasized the advisory nature of the peer review process. See Antitrust Division, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Business Review Letter to the International Chiropractors Association
(Mar. 2, 1977). The Second Circuit modified a Federal Trade Commission order against the
American Medical Association so as to exempt from the order "professional peer review of
the fee practices of physicians." American Medical Ass'n v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443, 453 (2d Cir.
1980), aff'd, 455 U.S. 676 (1982). See also Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 781
(1975) (suggesting that "a purely advisory fee schedule" might be lawful).
195. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
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B. Antitrust Scrutiny of Provider Arrangements
The Supreme Court in Royal Drug noted that the legality of
provider arrangements was not before the Court.196 Subsequent
lower court decisions, however, have addressed the issue. Like fee
schedules, provider arrangements may be classified into two cate-
gories for the purpose of antitrust scrutiny, depending upon
whether provider domination of the insurer exists.
1. Provider-Dominated Provider Arrangements
Whenever the providers supplying the services under the pro-
vider arrangement dominate or control the insurer, the arrange-
ment may be challenged as a form of horizontal maximum price-
fixing, because concerted action among horizontal competitors ex-
ists. 9 7 The prices being fixed are the fee that the insured must pay
and the provider's cost for the goods or services.198
The Court's holding in Maricopa County may be applicable to
this type of arrangement. Prior to Maricopa County, the Virginia
Supreme Court in Blue Cross of Virginia v. Virginia9 ' held that a
provider arrangement was illegal per se as a horizontal price-fixing
conspiracy because evidence existed that the insurer had consulted
with the providers about the "acceptability" of the arrangement.
An individual also can challenge the arrangements on the ground
that they constitute a conspiracy to boycott because the arrange-
196. 440 U.S. at 210 & n.5.
197. See Hoffman v. Delta Dental Plan of Minn., 517 F. Supp. 564, 571 (D. Minn. 1981).
198. See Sausalito Pharmacy, Inc. v. Blue Shield of Cal., 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH)
63,695 at 77,723 (N.D. Cal. 1980), aff'd per curiam, 677 F.2d 47 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 376 (1982).
199. 211 Va. 180, 189-92, 176 S.E.2d 439, 443-46 (1970). The decision is reviewed favora-
bly in Comment, A "Fix" at the Local Drug Store-Blue Cross Runs Afoul of the Sherman
Act, 57 VA. L. REv. 315 (1971), and criticized in Oppenheim, Antitrust Policy and Third-
Party Prepaid Prescription Drug Plan, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 244, 246-66 (1971). See also
General Glass Co. v. Globe Glass and Trim Co., 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,531 (N.D. Ill.
1980) (reserving for trial the question of whether the insurer had participated in an illegal
horizontal price-fixing conspiracy where the evidence included discussions among providers
about the insurer's prices). See generally Problems of Third Party Prepaid Prescription
Programs: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Problems Affecting Small
Business of the House Permanent Select Comm. on Small Business, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
51-79 (1973) (an insurer should avoid any activities that might support an inference of collu-
sion between the insurer and providers).
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ments involve concerted action.2 0 The boycott stems from the re-
fusal of the insurer and its providers to deal with other providers
except on coercive terms. Although group boycotts generally are
considered illegal per se,201 lower courts have applied the per se
rule only when the evidence established that the parties intended
to boycott, coerce, or intimidate other providers.20 2 Therefore, the
per se rule should apply only when a provider-dominated insurer
intends to boycott nonparticipating providers; otherwise, the rule
of reason is the proper approach.
Under the rule of reason, an open-panel provider arrangement
that is instituted by a controlled or dominated insurer should not
constitute an illegal boycott because the arrangement does not pre-
clude policyholders from using nonparticipating providers. Fur-
thermore, the pressure exerted on nonparticipating providers to
lower their prices and to participate in the arrangement should
foster competition and, therefore, would not protect inefficient
providers.
If the provider arrangement is essentially a closed-panel arrange-
ment, courts should find that the arrangement is illegal as an un-
reasonable restraint of trade.2 03 Rather than foster competition,
this type of arrangement forecloses competition by precluding non-
participating providers from competing with participating provid-
ers. Open-panel arrangements provide a more competitive alterna-
tive, allowing nonparticipating providers to compete at least on the
basis of nonprice factors such as service.2 4
200. See Hoffman v. Delta Dental Plan of Minn., 517 F. Supp. 564, 573 (D. Minn. 1981)
(upholding a boycott charge against an FMC-initiated provider arrangement).
201. See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1950); Fashion Origina-
tors' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
202. See supra note 181.
203. See Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Va., 624 F.2d 476
(4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981). In determining that the insurer's practices
were not exempt under the Act, the court emphasized that the insurer had failed to offer
equal terms of reimbursement to psychologists, who could obtain reimbursement only if
they billed for their services through a physician. Id. at 484. But see Klamath Lake Pharma-
ceutical Ass'n v. Klamath Medical Serv. Bureau, 507 F. Supp. 980, 983-84 (D. Ore. 1981)
(upholding a closed-panel arrangement because the policyholders could go to nonparticipat-
ing providers "in an emergency" or when the insurer-owned pharmacy was closed).
204. Nonparticipating providers generally are placed at a cost disadvantage by the pro-
vider arrangement. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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2. Independent-Insurer Provider Arrangements
If an independent insurer arranges with a provider to supply
goods or services, the arrangement may be challenged as a form of
vertical price-fixing. Such arrangements facially resemble maxi-
mum resale price maintenance, which is illegal per se.205 Like a dis-
tributor that agrees to sell products at the price established by the
manufacturer, a provider that chooses to participate in a provider
arrangement agrees to charge no more than the insured's deducti-
ble amount, and to accept a fixed reimbursement from the insurer.
Several differences, however, suggest that courts should not find
independent-insurer provider arrangements illegal per se.
First, maximum resale price maintenance is bilateral, while pro-
vider arrangements create a trilateral relationship between the in-
surer, the provider, and the insured. 06 Second, provider arrange-
ments do not involve the resale of any goods or services. The
insured is simply a buyer who partially reimburses a provider for
his services. If an insurer is a purchaser, then the insurer should
have the right to negotiate the most favorable bargain possible. In-
deed, in examining the legality of an arrangement similar to that in
Royal Drug, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit commented: "In its negotiating with hospitals, [the insurer]
has done no more than conduct its business as every rational en-
terprise does, i.e., get the best deal possible. 21 0 7 The Court in
Royal Drug implicitly agreed with this analysis by characterizing
provider agreements as mere "arrangements for the purchase of
goods and services by [the insurer]."20 Finally, the restraint im-
posed in a provider arrangement flows from the consumer, on
whose behalf the insurer is acting, up to the provider; in resale
price maintenance, the restraint flows down from the manufacturer
to the distributor. 09 Independent-insurer provider arrangements,
205. See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
206. Comment, supra note 188, at 513.
207. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross of W. Pa., 481 F.2d 80, 84 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1093 (1973).
208. 440 U.S. at 214.
209. Comment, supra note 188, at 514. In addition, per se rules are appropriate only when
the activity in question is "plainly anticompetitve," National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978), and "lack[s] any redeeming virtue," Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). Furthermore, courts should apply a per se rule
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therefore, should pose no antitrust problems.
Courts have recognized these differences and have refused to ap-
ply a per se rule, 10 preferring instead to examine provider arrange-
ments under the rule of reason. Under this analysis, provider ar-
rangements clearly pass muster."' An insurer with many
policyholders may be able to overcome the price insensitivity typi-
cal in the health care field by using its position to force providers
to supply services at more competitive prices.2 12 The inability of
some inefficient providers to participate in the arrangement is a
desirable ancillary effect. The antitrust laws encourage vigorous
competition and do not shelter inefficient competitors or antiquat-
ed modes of competition that no longer meet the needs of consum-
ers. 2 s Thus, absent other factors that indicate an anticompetitive
purpose or effect, independent insurer-instituted provider arrange-
ments do not violate the antitrust laws.21 4
Plaintiffs also have challenged independent insurer-instituted
only after determining the full effect of the activity in question. National Soc'y of Profes-
sional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692. Accord Medical Arts Pharmacy of Stamford, Inc. v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Conn., 675 F.2d 502, 505-06 (2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
210. See, e.g., Medical Arts Pharmacy of Stamford, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Conn., 675 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982); Manasen v. California
Dental Serv., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) T63,959 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Sausalito Pharmacy, Inc. v.
Blue Shield of Cal., 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH) T63,695 (N.D. Cal. 1980), aff'd per curiam,
677 F.2d 47 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 376 (1982).
211. Accord Comment, supra note 188, at 536-37. Indeed, no court that has reviewed in-
surer-initiated provider arrangements has declared them illegal as a form of vertical price-
fixing. See, e.g., Medical Arts Pharmacy of Stamford, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Conn., 675 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
675 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 86 (1982); Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. All-
state Ins. Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982); Sausalito
Pharmacy, Inc. v. Blue Shield of Cal., 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH) T63,695 (N.D. Cal. 1980),
aff'd per curiam, 677 F.2d 47 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 376 (1982); Chick's Auto
Body v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 168 N.J. Super. 68, 401 A.2d 722 (1979), aff'd per
curiam, 176 N.J. Super. 320, 423 A.2d 311 (1980).
212. See Comment, supra note 188, at 518-23.
213. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962); Hanson v. Shell Oil
Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1358-59 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977).
214. The Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice agrees with this position,
maintaining that provider arrangements initiated by independent insurers do not create an-
titrust problems. See Business Review Letters from the Justice Dep't cited at [1973] ANT-
TRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 619, at A-7; [1975] ANTIrRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) No. 744, at A-14; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 11, 32-33, Group
Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
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provider arrangements as illegal forms of horizontal price-fixing.
When an independent insurer arranges individually with providers
to supply services, no horizontal agreement exists as required by
the Sherman Act.2 15 Nor may an agreement between the providers
be inferred from their independent decisions to participate in the
arrangement; the insurer's offer may be attractive to an individual
provider regardless of the decisions of other providers.21 6 Likewise,
allegations that independent insurer-instituted provider arrange-
ments constitute illegal boycotts would fail because no concerted
action exists.2  An individual insurer may unilaterally refuse to
deal with any provider.21 8
Finally, plaintiffs have challenged provider arrangements as vio-
lative of section 2 of the Sherman Act. The allegations involve at-
tempts by insurers to monopolize an insurance market or a pro-
vider market, or to use insurer buying power to coerce provider
participation.21 Courts have rejected these allegations. No viola-
tion exists as long as the arrangements do not preclude providers
from entering into agreements with other insurers, do not prohibit
policyholders from patronizing nonparticipating providers, and are
offered on equal terms to all providers. 220 Furthermore, as long as
insurers do not use their buying power to coerce the participation
of providers or engage in predatory pricing in an effort to drive
nonparticipating providers out of business, courts should uphold
215. See Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 660 F.2d 1195, 1200 (7th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982). Evidence of an agreement among providers, of course,
would present a different situation. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
216. See Theatre Enter., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954);
Third Party Prepaid Prescription Programs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Environ-
mental Problems Affecting Small Business of the House Select Comm. on Small Business,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 230-31 (1971).
217. See Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 660 F.2d 1195, 1206 (7th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982).
218. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
219. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross of W. Pa., 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973); Hoffman v. Delta Dental Plan of Minn., 517 F. Supp. 564 (D.
Minn. 1981); Anderson v. Medical Serv. of the D.C., 1976-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) T60,884 (E.D.
Va. 1976), aff'd, 551 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1977).
220. Rankin & Wilson, Sausalito Pharmacy and the Antitrust Consequences of Insurer-
Imposed Maximum Limitations on Fees, 26 ST. Louis U.L.J. 601, 621 (1982). Of course, a
plaintiff would have to establish the other elements of a violation under § 2 of the Sherman
Act.
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the arrangements against antitrust challenges.221
VI. CONCLUSION
To assure the ability of states to regulate and tax insurance com-
panies, Congress provided the insurance industry with a limited
exemption from the antitrust laws through the McCarran-Fergu-
son Act. Lower courts, however, initially construed the exemption
broadly. In several recent decisions, the Supreme Court has nar-
rowed significantly the scope of the exemption and has looked be-
yond the Act to consider the legality of insurer activities outside
the exemption. Interpretation and application of the Supreme
Court's holdings have resulted in confusion among the lower
courts.
This Article has organized and outlined a framework, consistent
with the recent Supreme Court decisions, for determining whether
the McCarran-Ferguson Act immunizes an insurer's activity from
the antitrust laws. Application of this framework to frequently
challenged insurer activities indicates that many practices, both
new and old, do not qualify for exemption from the antitrust laws.
This is due primarily to the Supreme Court's restrictive interpreta-
tion of the phrase "business of insurance."
The failure of frequently challenged insurer activities to fall
within the scope of the exemption, however, does not mean that all
such activities are illegal. Indeed, antitrust scrutiny of recently
adopted cost containment measures-provider arrangements and
fee schedules-indicates that courts should distinguish between ac-
tivities instituted by provider-dominated or provider-controlled in-
surers and those instituted by independent insurers. Activities in
the former category should be considered illegal per se. Application
of the rule of reason to activities in the latter category suggests
that these activities ordinarily are lawful. Thus, the recent Su-
preme Court decisions construing the scope of the McCarran-Fer-
guson Act, although greatly narrowing the Act's scope, have not
221. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross of W. Pa., 481 F.2d 80, 84-85 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973). Cf. United States v. New York Great A&P Tea Co., 173 F.2d
79, 83 (7th Cir. 1949) (buyer abused dominant position by employing boycotts and other
forms of coercion to obtain favorable terms from sellers).
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foreclosed the continued use of various cost containment measures
by insurance companies.
